Baron Reed (reed-b)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Reed, Baron. 2002a. “How to Think about Fallibilism.” Philosophical Studies 107(2): 143–157.
Reed, Baron. 2002b. “The Stoics’ Account of the Cognitive Impression.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 23, edited by David Sedley, pp. 147–180. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reed, Baron. 2005a. “Review of Nathan (2005).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(3): 735–739.
Reed, Baron. 2005b. “Accidentally Factive Mental States.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 134–142.
Reed, Baron. 2006. “Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1): 186–197.
Reed, Baron. 2008. “Certainty.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/certainty/.
Reed, Baron. 2009. “A New Argument for Skepticism.” Philosophical Studies 142(1): 91–104.
Reed, Baron. 2010. “A Defense of Stable Invariantism.” Noûs 44(2): 224–244.
Reed, Baron. 2012a. “Knowledge, Doubt, and Circularity.” Synthese 188(2): 273–287.
Reed, Baron. 2012b. “Fallibilism.” Philosophy Compass 7(9): 585–596.
Reed, Baron. 2013a. “Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency.” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 40–69. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Reed, Baron. 2013b. “Historical Reflections: Sosa’s Perspective on the Epistemological Tradition.” in Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John Turri, pp. 205–224. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
Reed, Baron. 2014. “Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 95–106. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Reed, Baron. 2015a. “Skepticism and Perception.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 66–80. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
Reed, Baron. 2015b. “Review of Zagzebski (2015).” The Philosophical Review 124(1): 159–162.
Reed, Baron. 2015c. “Reasons for Reasons.” Episteme 12(2): 241–247.
Reed, Baron. 2016a. “Who Knows?” in Performance Epistemology. Foundations and Applications, edited by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, pp. 106–123. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.001.0001.
Reed, Baron. 2016b. “Having to do with Knowledge.” Episteme 13(4): 549–554.
Reed, Baron. 2018. “Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 200–220. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
Reed, Baron. 2022. “Certainty.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/certainty/.
Sosa, Ernest, Villanueva, Enrique and Reed, Baron, eds. 2013. Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.

Further References

Nathan, Nicholas M. L. 2005. The Price of Doubt. London: Routledge.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. 2015. “Admiration and the Admirable.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 89: 205–221.