Susanna Rinard (rinard)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Rinard, Susanna. 2013a. “Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume IV, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 185–213. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.
Rinard, Susanna. 2013b. “Against Radical Credal Imprecision.” Thought 2(2): 157–165.
Rinard, Susanna. 2014. “The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability.” Thought 3(2): 110–114.
Rinard, Susanna. 2015a. “Against the New Evidentialists.” in Philosophical Issues 25: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 208–223. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Rinard, Susanna. 2015b. “A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.” Philosophers' imprint 15(7).
Rinard, Susanna. 2017a. “External World Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation.” in Best Explanations. New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, edited by Kevin McCain and Ted Poston, pp. 203–217. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746904.001.0001.
Rinard, Susanna. 2017b. “Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.” Res Philosophica 94(2): 257–273.