Kein Profilbild | No profile picture | Utilisateur n'as pas d'image
https://philosophie.ch/profil/roth-as

Abraham Sesshu Roth (roth-as)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

No contributions yet

Bibliography

    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 1996. Hume’s Psychology of Identity Ascriptions.” Hume Studies 22(2): 273–298.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2000. What was Hume’s Problem with Personal Identity? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(1): 91–114.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2003. Practical Intersubjectivity.” in Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality, edited by Frederick F. Schmitt, pp. 65–92. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2004. Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.” The Philosophical Review 113(3): 359–410.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2005. The Mysteries of Desire: A Discussion [of Mele (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 123(3): 273–293.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2006. Causation.” in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise, edited by Saul Traiger, pp. 95–113. Blackwell Guides to Great Works. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470776377.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2010. Shared Agency.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/shared-agency/.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2014a. Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.” Noûs 48(4): 626–652.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2014b. Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own.” in From Individual to Collective Intentionality. New Essays, edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer, pp. 137–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936502.001.0001.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2014c. Team Reasoning and Shared Intention.” in Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Contributions to Social Ontology, edited by Anita Konzelmann Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid, pp. 279–296. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality n. 2. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2017a. Entitlement to Reasons for Action.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume IV, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 75–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805601.001.0001.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2017b. Interpersonal Obligation in Joint Action.” in The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, edited by Marija Jankovic and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 45–57. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2017c. Shared Agency.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/shared-agency/.
    Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2020. Collective Responsibility and Entitlement to Collective Reasons for Action.” in The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility, edited by Saba Bazargan-Forward and Deborah Perron Tollefsen, pp. 243–257. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References