Abraham Sesshu Roth (roth-as)
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Bibliography
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 1996. “Hume’s Psychology of Identity Ascriptions.”
Hume Studies 22(2): 273–298.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2000. “What was Hume’s Problem with Personal
Identity?” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 61(1): 91–114.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2003.
“Practical Intersubjectivity.” in Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social
Reality, edited by Frederick F. Schmitt, pp. 65–92. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
& Littlefield.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2004. “Shared Agency and Contralateral
Commitments.” The Philosophical Review 113(3):
359–410.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2005. “The Mysteries of Desire: A Discussion [of Mele
(2003)].” Philosophical Studies 123(3):
273–293.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2006.
“Causation.” in The
Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise, edited by Saul
Traiger, pp. 95–113. Blackwell Guides to Great Works. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470776377.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2010.
“Shared Agency.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/shared-agency/.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2014a. “Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared
Activity.” Noûs 48(4): 626–652.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2014b. “Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with
Minds of Their Own.” in From
Individual to Collective Intentionality. New Essays, edited
by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer, pp. 137–162. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936502.001.0001.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2014c. “Team Reasoning and Shared Intention.” in
Institutions, Emotions, and Group
Agents. Contributions to Social Ontology, edited by Anita
Konzelmann Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid, pp. 279–296. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality n. 2.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2017a. “Entitlement to Reasons for Action.” in
Oxford Studies in Agency and
Responsibility, volume IV, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 75–92. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805601.001.0001.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2017b. “Interpersonal Obligation in Joint Action.”
in The Routledge Handbook of Collective
Intentionality, edited by Marija Jankovic and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 45–57. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2017c.
“Shared Agency.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/shared-agency/.
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. 2020. “Collective Responsibility and Entitlement to Collective
Reasons for Action.” in The
Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility, edited by
Saba Bazargan-Forward and Deborah Perron
Tollefsen, pp. 243–257. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Further References
Mele, Alfred R. 2003. Motivation and Agency. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/019515617X.001.0001.