Hans Rott (rott)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Brun, Georg and Rott, Hans. 2013. “Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision.” Synthese 190(18): 4041–4063.
Daiber, Jürgen, Konrad, Eva-Maria, Petraschka, Thomas and Rott, Hans, eds. 2012. Understanding Fiction. Knowledge and Meaning in Literature. Münster: Mentis Verlag.
Daiber, Jürgen, Konrad, Eva-Maria, Petraschka, Thomas and Rott, Hans, eds. 2013. Fiktion, Wahrheit, Interpretation. Philologische und philosophische Perspektiven. Münster: Mentis Verlag.
Egré, Paul and Rott, Hans. 2021. “The Logic of Conditionals.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/logic-conditionals/.
Fermé, Eduardo Leopoldo and Rott, Hans. 2004. “Revision by Comparison.” Artificial Intelligence 157(1–2): 5–47.
Freitag, Wolfgang, Rott, Hans, Sturm, Holger and Zinke, Alexandra, eds. 2016. Von Rang und Namen. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn. Münster: Mentis Verlag.
Fuhrmann, André and Rott, Hans, eds. 1996. Logic, Action, and Information: Essays on Logic in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Gärdenfors, Peter and Rott, Hans. 1992. “Belief Revision.” issn 1101-8453. Lund: Lund University Cognitive Studies.
Gärdenfors, Peter and Rott, Hans. 1995. “Belief Revision.” in Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Volume 4: Epistemic and Temporal Logics, edited by Dov M. Gabbay, Christopher J. Hogger, and James A. Robinson, pp. 35–132. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hinzen, Wolfram and Rott, Hans, eds. 2002. Belief and Meaning. Essays at the Interface. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 6. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Horák, Vı́tezslav and Rott, Hans. 2003. “Introduction.” in Possibility and Reality – Metaphysics and Logic, edited by Hans Rott and Vı́tezslav Horák, pp. 1–12. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Konrad, Eva-Maria and Rott, Hans. 2017. “Fiktive Gegenstände.” in Handbuch Metaphysik, edited by Markus Schrenk, pp. 141–144. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.
Rott, Hans. 1987. “Ways of Triviality in Conditional Languages.” Unpublished manuscript, Munich.
Rott, Hans. 1990. “Updates, Conditionals, and Non-Monotonicity.” in Conditionals, Defaults, and Belief Revision, edited by Hans Kamp, pp. 65–77. Stuttgart: Institut für maschinelle Sprachverarbeitung, Universität Stuttgart.
Rott, Hans. 1991a. “Two Methods of Constructing Contractions and Revisions in Knowledge Systems.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 20(2): 149–173.
Rott, Hans. 1991b. “A Nonmonotonic Conditional Logic for Belief Revision. Part 1: Semantics and Logic of Simple Conditionals.” in The Logic of Theory Change, edited by André Fuhrmann and Michael Morreau, pp. 135–184. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence n. 465. Berlin: Springer.
Rott, Hans. 1992a. “On the Logic of Theory Change: More Maps Between Different Kinds of Contraction Function.” in Belief Revision, edited by Peter Gärdenfors, pp. 122–141. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rott, Hans. 1992b. “Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment.” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 1(1): 45–78.
Rott, Hans. 1993. “Belief Contraction in the Context for the General Theory of Rational Choice.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 58: 1426–1450.
Rott, Hans. 1994. “Chaos: The Reason for Structural Causation.” in Logic and Causal Reasoning, edited by Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, and Max Urchs, pp. 191–216. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Rott, Hans. 1997a. “Comment on Gärdenfors (1997).” in Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, edited by Martin Carrier and Peter K. Machamer, pp. 87–98. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Rott, Hans. 1997b. “Vom Primat der praktischen Vernunft. Logische Regeln als Regeln rationaler Wahl.” in Analyomen 2. Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, edited by Georg Meggle, pp. 138–147. Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy n. 16. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Rott, Hans. 1998. “Logic and Choice.” in TARK 1997. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge: Proceedings of the Seventh Conference, edited by Itzhak Gilboa, pp. 235–248. San Francisco, California: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
Rott, Hans. 1999a. “Coherence and Conservation in the Dynamics of Beliefs: Part I: Finding the Right Framework.” Unpublished manuscript.
Rott, Hans. 1999b. “Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.” in Spinning Ideas: Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors, edited by Sören Halldén, Bengt Hansson, Włodzimierz [Wlodek] Rabinowicz, and Nils-Eric Sahlin. Lund: Lunds Universitet, http://www.lucs.lu.se/spinning/.
Rott, Hans. 2000a. “Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(9): 503–522. Republication of Rott (1999b).
Rott, Hans. 2000b. “Words in Contexts: Fregean Elucidations.” Linguistics and Philosophy 23(6): 621–641.
Rott, Hans. 2000c. “ ‘Just Because’: Taking Belief Bases Seriously.” in Logic Colloquium ’98 – Proceedings of the Annual European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic held in Prague, edited by Samuel R. Buss, Petr Hájek, and Pavel Pudlák, pp. 387–408. Lecture Notes in Logic n. 13. Urbana, Illinois: Association of Symbolic Logic; A.K. Peters.
Rott, Hans. 2002. Change, Choice, and Inference. A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford Logic Guides n. 42. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rott, Hans. 2003a. “Variably Restricted Necessity: Truth and Fiction in the Interpretation of Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals.” in Possibility and Reality – Metaphysics and Logic, edited by Hans Rott and Vı́tezslav Horák, pp. 269–296. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Rott, Hans. 2003b. “Basic Entrenchment.” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 75(2): 257–280.
Rott, Hans. 2003c. “Lehrer’s Dynamic Theory of Knowledge.” in The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 219–242. Philosophical Studies Series n. 95. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rott, Hans. 2003d. “Economics and Economy in the Theory of Belief Revision.” in Knowledge Contributors, edited by Vincent F. Hendricks, Klaus Frovin Jørgensen, and Stig Andur Pedersen, pp. 57–86. Synthese Library n. 322. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rott, Hans. 2004a. “Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge.” Erkenntnis 61(2–3): 469–493. Reprinted in Brendel and Jäger (2005, 327–352).
Rott, Hans. 2004b. “Vom Fliessen theoretischer Begriffe: Begriffliches Wissen und theoretischer Wandel.” Kant-Studien 95(1): 29–52.
Rott, Hans. 2004c. “Supplying Planks for Neurath’s Boat: Can Economists Meet the Demands of the Dynamics of Scientific Theories?” in Induction and Deduction in the Sciences, edited by Friedrich Stadler, pp. 225–246. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook n. 11. Dordrecht: Springer.
Rott, Hans. 2006a. “Disagreement and Misunderstanding Across Cultures.” in Proceedings of the 29th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Cultures. Conflict – Analysis – Dialogue, edited by Christian Kanzian and Edmund Runggaldier, pp. 261–276. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 3. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Rott, Hans. 2006b. “The Value of Truth and the Value of Information: On Isaac Levi’s Epistemology.” in Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 179–200. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rott, Hans. 2008. “Information Structures in Belief Revision.” in Philosophy of Information, edited by Pieter Adriaans and Johan van Benthem, pp. 457–482. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 8. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Rott, Hans. 2009a. “Seltsame Wahlen. Zur Rationalität vermeintlicher Anomalien beim Entscheiden und Schlussfolgern.” Studia Philosophica. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68: 43–64.
Rott, Hans. 2009b. “Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs.” in Degrees of Belief, edited by Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, pp. 301–340. Synthese Library n. 342. Dordrecht: Springer.
Rott, Hans. 2009c. “Shifting Prorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators.” in Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Papers from the Studia Logica Conference Trends in Logic IV, edited by David C. Makinson, Jacek Malinowski, and Heinrich Theodor Wansing, pp. 269–296. Trends in Logic n. 28. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9084-4_14.
Rott, Hans. 2014a. “Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 6): 1219–1252.
Rott, Hans. 2014b. “Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change.” in The Logica Yearbook 2013, edited by Michal Dančák and Vı́t Punčochář, pp. 187–206. London: College Publications.
Rott, Hans. 2015. “A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements.” Erkenntnis 80(suppl., 1): 167–189.
Rott, Hans. 2017a. “Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief.” Synthese 194(8): 2695–2720.
Rott, Hans. 2017b. “Preservation and Postulation: Lessons from the New Debate on the Ramsey Test.” Mind 126(502): 609–626.
Rott, Hans and Horák, Vı́tezslav, eds. 2003. Possibility and Reality – Metaphysics and Logic. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Rott, Hans and Pagnucco, Maurice. 1999. “Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery).” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 28(5): 501–547. Corrected version published in Journal of Philosophical Logic (2000), vol. 29, no. 1.

Further References

Brendel, Elke and Jäger, Christoph, eds. 2005. Contextualisms in Epistemology. Dordrecht: Springer.
Gärdenfors, Peter. 1997. “Meanings as Conceptual Structures.” in Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, edited by Martin Carrier and Peter K. Machamer, pp. 61–86. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.