Robert Schroer (schroer-r)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

O’Sullivan, Brendan and Schroer, Robert. 2012. “Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain.” The Philosophical Quarterly 62(249): 737–758.
Schroer, Jeanine Weekes and Schroer, Robert. 2014. “Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity.” Philosophical Studies 171(3): 445–469.
Schroer, Robert. 2002a. “Matching Sensible Qualities: A Skeleton in the Closet for Representationalism.” Philosophical Studies 107(3): 259–273.
Schroer, Robert. 2002b. “Seeing It All Clearly: The Real Story on Blurry Vision.” American Philosophical Quarterly 39(3): 297–301.
Schroer, Robert. 2007. “The Reticence of Visual Phenomenal Character: A Spatial Interpretation of Transparency.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(3): 393–414.
Schroer, Robert. 2008a. “Memory Foundationalism and the Problem of Unforgotten Carelessness.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 74–85.
Schroer, Robert. 2008b. “The Woman in the Painting and the Image in the Penny: an Investigation of Phenomenological Doubleness, Seeing-in, and ‘Reversed Seeing-in’ .” Philosophical Studies 139(3): 329–341.
Schroer, Robert. 2010. “Is there More Than One Categorical Property?” The Philosophical Quarterly 60(241): 831–850.
Schroer, Robert. 2011. “Can Determinable Properties Earn Their Keep?” Synthese 183(2): 229–247.
Schroer, Robert. 2013a. “Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The ‘Partial Consideration Strategy,’ Partially Considered.” Metaphysica 14(1): 63–77.
Schroer, Robert. 2013b. “Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?” Dialectica 67(4): 561–577.
Schroer, Robert. 2013c. “Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50(4): 339–356.