François Schroeter (schroeter-f)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Jones, Karen and Schroeter, François. 2012. “Moral Expertise.” Analyse & Kritik 34(2): 217–230.
Jones, Karen and Schroeter, François. 2014. “Co-deliberation, Joint Decision, and Testimony about Reasons Reply to Steinig (2012).” Analyse & Kritik 36(1): 209–216.
Jones, Karen and Schroeter, François. 2018a. The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198797074.001.0001.
Jones, Karen and Schroeter, François. 2018b. “Moral Expertise.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 459–471. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.
Schroeter, François. 2004. “Endorsement and Autonomous Agency.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(3): 633–659.
Schroeter, François. 2005. “Normative Concepts and Motivation.” Philosophers' imprint 5(3).
Schroeter, François. 2008a. “Experimental Philosophers, Conceptual Analysts, and the Rest of Us.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 11(2): 143–149.
Schroeter, François. 2008b. “Wieviele moralische Wahrheiten gibt es?” Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie 37(92): 82–103.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2009a. “A Third Way in Metaethics.” Noûs 43(1): 1–30.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2009b. “Reasons as Right-Makers.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 12(3): 279–296.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2013. “Normative Realism: Co-Reference without Convergence?” Philosophers' imprint 13(13).
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2014a. “Normative Concepts: A Connectedness Model.” Philosophers' imprint 14(25).
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2014b. “Jazz Redux: A Reply to Möller.” Philosophical Studies 170(2): 303–316.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2014c. “Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of Normative Judgment.” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 248–272. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2015. “Rationalizing Self-Interpretation.” in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, edited by Christopher John Daly, pp. 419–447. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9781137344557.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2016. “Semantic Deference versus Semantic Coordination.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(2): 193–210.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2018a. “Metasemantics and Metaethics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 519–535. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2018b. “Keeping Track of What’s Right.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(3–4): 489–509.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2020. “Inscrutability and Its Discontents [on Cappelen (2018)].” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(5): 566–579.
Schroeter, Laura and Schroeter, François. 2021. “Bad News for Ardent Normative Realists?” Ergo 7(38): 1015–1052, doi:10.3998/ergo.1135.
Schroeter, Laura, Schroeter, François and Jones, Karen. 2015. “Do Emotions Represent Values?” Dialectica 69(3): 357–380. Special issue “Beyond Perceptualism,” edited by Sabine A. Döring and Anika Lutz.

Further References

Birnbacher, Dieter. 2012. “Can there be Such a Thing as Ethical Expertise?” Analyse & Kritik 34(2): 237–249.
Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language. An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198814719.001.0001.
Steinig, Tobias. 2012. “Experts, Teachers and Their Epistemic Roles in Normative and Non-normative Domains Comments on Birnbacher (2012) and Jones and Schroeter (2012).” Analyse & Kritik 34(2): 251–274.