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Scott R. Sehon (sehon)

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Bibliography

    Löhrer, Guido and Sehon, Scott R. 2016. The Davisonian Challenge to the Non-Causalist.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(1): 85–95.
    Sehon, Scott R. 1994. Teleology and the Nature of Mental States.” American Philosophical Quarterly 31: 63–72.
    Sehon, Scott R. 1997. Natural Kind Terms and the Status of Folk Psychology.” American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 333–344.
    Sehon, Scott R. 1998. Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation.” Philosophical Psychology 11: 511–532.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2000. An Argument against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 67–85.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2005. Teleological Realism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2007. Goal-Directed Action and Teleological Explanation.” in Causation and Explanation, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 155–170. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 3. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1753.001.0001.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2010a. Teleological Explanation.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, pp. 121–128. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444323528.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2010b. The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism Leads to Moral Paralysis.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67(2): 67–80.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2011. A Flawed Conception of Determinism in the Consequence Argument.” Analysis 71(1): 30–38.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2012. Action Explanation and the Free Will Debate: How Incompatibilist Arguments Go Wrong.” in Philosophical Issues 22: Action Theory, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Berit Brogaard, pp. 351–368. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2013. Epistemic Issues in the Free Will Debates: Can we Know when We Are Free? Philosophical Studies 166(2): 363–380, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0044-z.
    Sehon, Scott R. 2016. Free Will and Action Explanation. A Non-Causal, Compatilist Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.001.0001.