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Yaroslav V. Shramko (shramko)

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Bibliography

    Scheffler, Uwe and Shramko, Yaroslav V. 2000. The Logical Ontology of Negative Facts: On what is not.” in Things, Facts and Events, edited by Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, and Max Urchs, pp. 109–132. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 76. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 1994a. Relevant Properties.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 2: 103–115. Special issue on Ontologic, Essays in Formal Ontology, ed. by Uwe Scheffler and Max Urchs.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 1994b. Applying Relevant Logic to the Analysis of Some Problems of Causality.” in Logic and Causal Reasoning, edited by Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, and Max Urchs, pp. 109–122. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 1997. Time and Negation.” in Perspectives on Time, edited by Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, and Max Urchs, pp. 399–416. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 189. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 1998. A Philosophically Plausible Modified Grzegorczyk Semantics for First-Degree Intuitionistic Entailment.” Logique et Analyse 41(161–163): 167–188.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 1999. Review of Hansen (1996).” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 63(1): 429–432.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 2000. American Plan for Intuitionistic Logic 1: An Intuitive Background.” in The Logica Yearbook 1999, edited by Timothy Childers, pp. 53–64. Praha: Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického ústavu AV ČR.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 2001. Semantics for Constructive Negation.” in Essays on Non-Classical Logics, edited by Heinrich Theodor Wansing, pp. 187–218. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 2012. What is a Genuine Intuitionistic Notion of Falsity? Logic and Logical Philosophy 21(1): 3–23.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 2014. The Logical Way of Being True: Truth Values and the Ontological Foundation of Logic.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 23(2): 119–131.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 2015. Is Time Reversible? Logic and Logical Philosophy 24(2): 143–153.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. 2016. Truth, Falsehood, Information and Beyond: The American Plan Generalized.” in J. Michael Dunn on Information Based Logics, edited by Katalin Bimbó, pp. 191–212. Outstanding Contributions to Logic n. 8. Cham: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-29300-4.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. and Wansing, Heinrich Theodor. 2010. Truth Values.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/truth-values/.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. and Wansing, Heinrich Theodor. 2014. Truth Values.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/truth-values/.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. and Wansing, Heinrich Theodor. 2015. Truth Values.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/truth-values/.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. and Wansing, Heinrich Theodor. 2016. Truth Values.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/truth-values/.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. and Wansing, Heinrich Theodor. 2017. Truth Values.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/truth-values/.
    Shramko, Yaroslav V. and Wansing, Heinrich Theodor. 2020. Truth Values.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/truth-values/.
    Wansing, Heinrich Theodor and Shramko, Yaroslav V. 2008. A Note on Two Ways of Defining a Many-Valued Logic.” in The Logica Yearbook 2007, edited by Michal Peliš, pp. 255–266. Praha: Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického ústavu AV ČR.

Further References

    Hansen, Kaj Börge. 1996. Applied Logic. Uppsala: Studia Philosophica Upsaliensala.