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Julia Staffel (staffel)

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Bibliography

    de Bona, Glauber and Staffel, Julia. 2018. Why Be (Approximately) Coherent? Analysis 78(3): 405–415, doi:10.1093/analys/anx159.
    Staffel, Julia. 2011. Reply to Sørensen (2010).” Analysis 71(2): 300–303.
    Staffel, Julia. 2013. Can there be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief? Synthese 190(16): 3535–3551.
    Staffel, Julia. 2015a. Measuring the Overall Incoherence of Credence Functions.” Synthese 192(5): 1467–1493.
    Staffel, Julia. 2015b. Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 44(3): 273–286.
    Staffel, Julia. 2016. Beliefs, Buses and Lotteries: Why Rational Belief Can’t Be Stably High Credence.” Philosophical Studies 173(7): 1721–1734.
    Staffel, Julia. 2017a. Accuracy for Believers.” Episteme 14(1): 39–48.
    Staffel, Julia. 2017b. Should I Pretend I’m Perfect? Res Philosophica 94(2): 301–324.
    Staffel, Julia. 2019a. Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833710.001.0001.
    Staffel, Julia. 2019b. Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 161–189. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.
    Staffel, Julia. 2019c. Knowledge Lies and Group Lies.” in The Oxford Handbook of Lying, edited by Jörg Meibauer, pp. 231–243. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.001.0001.
    Staffel, Julia. 2019d. Credences and Suspended Judgments as Transitional Attitudes.” in Philosophical Issues 29: Epistemology, edited by Lisa Miracchi, pp. 281–294. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12154.
    Staffel, Julia. 2021. Pro Tem Rationality.” in Philosophical Perspectives 35: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 383–403. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12143.
    Staffel, Julia. 2024. Bayesian Norms and Non-Ideal Agents.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 135–147. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.

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