Nicholas F. Stang (stang-nf)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Schafer, Karl and Stang, Nicholas F., eds. 2022. The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds: New Essays on Kant’s Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688265.001.0001.
Segal, Aaron and Stang, Nicholas F., eds. forthcoming. Systematic Metaphysics: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2008. “Kant’s Modal Metaphysics.” PhD dissertation, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2010. “Kant’s Possibility Proof.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 27(3): 275–299.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2011. “Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the A Priori?” Noûs 45(3): 443–471.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2012a. “A Kantian Reply to Bolzano’s Critique of Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 85: 33–61. “Bolzano & Kant,” ed. by Sandra Lapointe.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2012b. “Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20(6): 1117–1139.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2013a. “Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan (2009).” Kantian Review 18(1): 99–106.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2013b. “Adickes on Double Affection.” in Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, volume 2, edited by Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, and Margit Ruffing, pp. 787–808. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2014a. “The Non-Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves.” Noûs 48(1): 106–136.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2014b. “Kant, Bolzano, and the Formality of Logic.” in New Anti-Kant, pp. 192–234. History of Analytic Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Translated and edited by C. Tolley and S. Lapointe.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2014c. “Greenberg on Kant, Existence and De Re Necessity [review of Greenberg (2008)].” Kantian Review 19(3): 475–489.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2015a. “Who’s Afraid of Double Affection?” Philosophers' imprint 15(18).
Stang, Nicholas F. 2015b. “Kant’s Argument that Existence is Not a Determination.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(3): 583–626.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2016a. Kant’s Modal Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712626.001.0001.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2016b. “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2016c. “Divine Necessity and Kant’s Modal Categories.” in The Tbilisi Symposium on Logic, Language and Computation: Selected Papers, edited by Jonathan Ginzburg, Zurab Khasidashvili, Carl Vogel, Jean-Jaques Lévy, and Enric Vallduvı́, pp. 232–255. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2017a. “Review of Anderson (2015).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(2): 394–397.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2017b. “Transcendental Idealism Without Tears.” in Idealism. New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Tyron Craig Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce, pp. 82–103. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746973.001.0001.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2018. “Kant’s Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to my Critics.” European Journal of Philosophy 26(3): 1159–1167.
Stang, Nicholas F. 2021. “Kant on Real Possibility.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 378–389. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Stang, Nicholas F. forthcoming. “Why Should Metaphysics Be Systematic? Contemporary Answers and Kant’s.” in Systematic Metaphysics: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Aaron Segal and Nicholas F. Stang. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stang, Nicholas F. and Schafer, Karl, eds. 2022. The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds: New Essays on Kant’s Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Anderson, R. Lanier. 2015. The Poverty of Conceptual Truth. Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198724575.001.0001.
Greenberg, Robert S. 2008. Real Existence, Ideal Necessity. Kantstudien. Ergänzungshefte n. 157. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Hogan, Desmond. 2009. “Noumenal Affection.” The Philosophical Review 118(4): 501–532.