Bart Streumer (streumer)
Email:
b.streumer(at)rug.nl
Cited in the following articles
Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral ObligationContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Hooker, Brad and Streumer, Bart. 2004. “Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, edited by Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling, pp. 57–74. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.001.0001.
Streumer, Bart. 2003. “Does ‘Ought’ Conversationally Implicate ‘Can’?” European Journal of Philosophy 11(2): 219–228, doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00184.
Streumer, Bart. 2007a. “Reasons and Impossibility.” Philosophical Studies 136(3): 351–384, doi:10.1007/s11098-005-4282-1.
Streumer, Bart. 2007b. “Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(1): 1–29.
Streumer, Bart. 2008. “Are there Irreducibly Normative Properties?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(4): 537–561.
Streumer, Bart. 2010a. “Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer (2010).” Philosophical Studies 151(1): 79–86, doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9422-6.
Streumer, Bart. 2010b. “Practical Reasoning.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, pp. 244–251. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444323528.
Streumer, Bart. 2011. “Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?” Philosophical Studies 154(3): 325–348.
Streumer, Bart. 2013a. “Can we Believe the Error Theory?” The Journal of Philosophy 110(4): 194–212.
Streumer, Bart. 2013b. “Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties.” in Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, edited by David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little, pp. 310–336. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.001.0001.
Streumer, Bart, ed. 2014. Irrealism in Ethics. Ratio Special Issues. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118837368.
Streumer, Bart. 2017. Unbelievable Errors. An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198785897.001.0001.
Streumer, Bart. 2018a. “Why we Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.” in Moral Skepticism. New Essays, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 71–90. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory. London: Routledge.
Streumer, Bart. 2018b. “Reasons and Ability.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 233–254. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Further References
Heuer, Ulrike. 2010. “Reasons and Impossibility.” Philosophical Studies 147(2): 235–246, doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9285-2.