Michael Strevens (strevens)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Strevens, Michael. 2000a. “Do Large Probabilities Explain Better?” Philosophy of Science 67(3): 366–390.
Strevens, Michael. 2000b. “The Essentialist Aspect of Naive Theories.” Cognition 74: 149–175.
Strevens, Michael. 2003. “Against Lewis’s New Theory of Causation: A Story with Three Morals.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84(4): 398–412, doi:10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00182.x.
Strevens, Michael. 2004. “The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified – Causally.” Noûs 38(1): 154–176.
Strevens, Michael. 2005a. “Bayes, Bayes’ Theorem, Bayesian Approach to Philosophy of Science.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Strevens, Michael. 2005b. “Chaos Theory.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Strevens, Michael. 2005c. “Explanation.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Strevens, Michael. 2005d. “Probability and Chance.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Strevens, Michael. 2006. “The Role of the Matthew Effect in Science.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 37(2): 159–170.
Strevens, Michael. 2007a. “Mackie Remixed.” in Causation and Explanation, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 93–118. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 3. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1753.001.0001.
Strevens, Michael. 2007b. “Review Essay on Woodward (2003).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(1): 233–249.
Strevens, Michael. 2007c. “Why Represent Causal Relations?” in Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation, edited by Alison Gopnik and Laura Schulz, pp. 245–260. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strevens, Michael. 2008a. “Physically Contingent Laws and Counterfactual Support.” Philosophers' imprint 8(8).
Strevens, Michael. 2008b. “Comments on Woodward, ‘Making Things Happen’ .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(1): 171–192.
Strevens, Michael. 2009a. Depth. An Account of Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Strevens, Michael. 2009b. “Objective Evidence and Absence: Comment on Sober (2009).” Philosophical Studies 143(1): 91–100.
Strevens, Michael. 2009c. “Remarks on Harman and Kulkarni (2009).” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(3): 27–41.
Strevens, Michael. 2010. “Reconsidering Authority: Scientific Expertise, Bounded Rationality, and Epistemic Backtracking.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume III, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 294–330. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strevens, Michael. 2011a. “Probability Out of Determinism.” in Probabilities in Physics, edited by Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann, pp. 339–364. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.001.0001.
Strevens, Michael. 2011b. “Economic Approaches to Understanding Scientific Norms.” Episteme 8(2): 184–200.
Strevens, Michael. 2012a. “Theoretical Terms without Analytic Truths.” Philosophical Studies 160(1): 167–190.
Strevens, Michael. 2012b. “The Explanatory Role of Irreducible Properties.” Noûs 46(4): 754–780.
Strevens, Michael. 2012c. “Ceteris Paribus Hedges: Causal Voodoo That Works.” The Journal of Philosophy 109(11): 652–675.
Strevens, Michael. 2013a. “Causality Reunified.” Erkenntnis 78(suppl., 2): 299–320.
Strevens, Michael. 2013b. “No Understanding Without Explanation.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44(3): 510–515.
Strevens, Michael. 2014. “High-Level Exceptions Explained.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 10): 1819–1832.
Strevens, Michael. 2015a. “Probabilistic Explanation.” in Physical Theory. Method and Interpretation, edited by Lawrence Sklar, pp. 40–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195145649.001.0001.
Strevens, Michael. 2015b. “Stochastic Independence and Causal Connection.” Erkenntnis 80(suppl., 3): 605–627.
Strevens, Michael. 2016. “Special-Science Autonomy and the Division of Labor.” in The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher, edited by Mark B. Couch and Jessica Pfeifer, pp. 153–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381357.001.0001.
Strevens, Michael. 2017a. “Ontology, Complexity, and Compositionality.” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. New Essays, edited by Matthew H. Slater and Zanja Yudell, pp. 41–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199363209.001.0001.
Strevens, Michael. 2017b. “How Idealizations Provide Understanding.” in Explaining Understanding. New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Stephen R. Grimm, Christoph Baumberger, and Sabine Ammon, pp. 37–49. London: Routledge.
Strevens, Michael. 2017c. “The Whole Story: Explanatory Autonomy and Convergent Evolution.” in Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, edited by David Michael Kaplan, pp. 101–118. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199685509.001.0001.
Strevens, Michael. 2018a. “The Mathematical Route to Causal Understanding.” in Explanation Beyond Causation. Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations, edited by Alexander Reutlinger and Juha Saatsi, pp. 96–116. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198777946.001.0001.
Strevens, Michael. 2018b. “Scientific Sharing, Communism, and the Social Contract.” in Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. New Essays, edited by Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson, and Michael Weisberg, pp. 3–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190680534.001.0001.
Strevens, Michael. 2019. Thinking Off Your Feet: How Empirical Psychology Vindicates Armchair Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Further References

Harman, Gilbert H. and Kulkarni, Sanjeev. 2007. Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Kulkarni, Sanjeev. 2009. “Précis of Harman and Kulkarni (2007).” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(3): 5–9.
Sober, Elliott R. 2009. “Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads.” Philosophical Studies 143(1): 63–90.
Woodward, James F. 2003. Making Things Happen. A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001.