Sarah Stroud (stroud-s)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Stroud, Sarah. 1996. “Dworkin and Casey on Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 25: 140–170.
Stroud, Sarah. 1999. “Déontologisme et droits.” Philosophiques 26(1).
Stroud, Sarah. 2000. “À la recherche de la source des normes déontologiques.” Philosophiques 28(1).
Stroud, Sarah. 2003. “Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement.” in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, pp. 121–146. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001.
Stroud, Sarah. 2006. “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.” Ethics 116(3): 498–524.
Stroud, Sarah. 2007. “Moral Worth and Rationality as Acting on Good Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 134(3): 449–456.
Stroud, Sarah. 2008. “Weakness of Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/weakness-will/.
Stroud, Sarah. 2011. “Acts of Will.” The Philosophical Quarterly 61(245): 851–855.
Stroud, Sarah. 2012. “Unsettling Subjectivism about Value.” in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding. Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, edited by Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-hung Wong, pp. 249–270. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.001.0001.
Stroud, Sarah. 2013a. “They Can’t Take That Away From Me: Restricting the Reach of Morality’s Demands.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume III, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 203–234. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.001.0001.
Stroud, Sarah. 2013b. “Irrationality.” in A Companion to Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 489–505. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328408.
Stroud, Sarah. 2014. “Weakness of Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/weakness-will/.
Stroud, Sarah. 2017. “Lying as Infidelity: A Quasi-Rossian Account.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VII, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 73–97. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198808930.001.0001.
Stroud, Sarah and Svirsky, Larisa. 2019. “Weakness of Will.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/weakness-will/.
Stroud, Sarah and Tappolet, Christine, eds. 2003a. Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001.
Stroud, Sarah and Tappolet, Christine. 2003b. “Introduction.” in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001.