Jonathan Sutton (sutton-j)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Gaukroger, Stephen, Schuster, John A. and Sutton, Jonathan, eds. 2000. Descartes’ Natural Philosophy. Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy n. 3. London: Routledge.
Sutton, Jonathan. 1998. Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2000a. “Symposium on Descartes on Perceptual Cognition: Introduction.” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, edited by Stephen Gaukroger, John A. Schuster, and Jonathan Sutton, pp. 524–527. Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy n. 3. London: Routledge.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2000b. “The Body and the Brain.” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, edited by Stephen Gaukroger, John A. Schuster, and Jonathan Sutton, pp. 697–722. Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy n. 3. London: Routledge.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2001. “The Contingent A Priori and Implicit Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(2): 251–278.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2002. “A New Argument against Modesty.” in Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 164–174. New York: Seven Bridges Press. Proceedings of the Eastern Washington University and the University of Idaho Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference on Meaning.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2003. “Memory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/memory/.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2004. “Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 89–108.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2007. Without Justification. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2010a. “Memory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/memory/.
Sutton, Jonathan. 2010b. “There are no Rational Pairs of Contradictory Beliefs (Whatever Some Philosophers of Language Say).” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume III, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 150–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press.