Neal A. Tognazzini (tognazzini)
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Bibliography
Coates, D. Justin and Tognazzini, Neal A., eds. 2012a. Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.001.0001.
Coates, D. Justin and Tognazzini, Neal A. 2012b. “The Nature and Ethics of the Blame.”
Philosophy Compass 7(3): 197–207.
Coates, D. Justin and Tognazzini, Neal A., eds. 2019a. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Themes from
the Philosophy of Gary Watson. vol. V. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198830238.001.0001.
Coates, D. Justin and Tognazzini, Neal A. 2019b.
“Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Themes from
the Philosophy of Gary Watson, volume V, edited by D. Justin
Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, pp. 1–4. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198830238.001.0001.
Fischer, John Martin and Tognazzini, Neal A. 2009. “The Truth about Tracing.”
Noûs 43(3): 531–556.
Fischer, John Martin and Tognazzini, Neal A. 2013. “The Logic of Theoretical Incompatibilism: A Reply to
Westphal.” Analysis 73(1): 46–48.
Leon, Felipe and Tognazzini, Neal A. 2010. “Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to
Succeed.” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 80(3): 551–565.
Shoemaker, David W. and Tognazzini, Neal A., eds. 2014a. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility.
vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722120.001.0001.
Shoemaker, David W. and Tognazzini, Neal A. 2014b.
“Editors’ Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility,
volume II, edited by David W. Shoemaker
and Neal A. Tognazzini, pp. 1–3. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722120.001.0001.
Todd, Patrick and Tognazzini, Neal A. 2008. “A Problem for Guidance Control.” The
Philosophical Quarterly 58(233): 685–692.
Tognazzini, Neal A. 2006. “Simples and the Possibility of Discrete
Space.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(1):
117–128.
Tognazzini, Neal A. 2010. “Persistence and Responsibility.” in
Time and Identity, edited by Joseph
Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 149–164. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 4. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014090.001.0001.
Tognazzini, Neal A. 2015a. “Grounding the Luck Objection.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(1): 127–138.
Tognazzini, Neal A. 2015b. “The Strains of Involvement.” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New
Essays, edited by Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith, pp. 19–44. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001.
Tognazzini, Neal A. and Coates, D. Justin. 2014.
“Blame.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/blame/.
Tognazzini, Neal A. and Coates, D. Justin. 2018.
“Blame.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/blame/.
Tognazzini, Neal A. and Coates, D. Justin. 2024.
“Blame.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/blame/.
Tognazzini, Neal A. and Fischer, John Martin. 2017. “Symposium on the Fixity of the Past: Incompatibilism and
the Fixity of the Past.” in Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of
Peter van Inwagen, edited by John Adorno Keller, pp. 140–148. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001.