Michael V. Wedin (wedin-mv)
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Bibliography
Donagan, Alan, Perovich, Anthony N., Jr. and Wedin, Michael V., eds. 1986. Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. Essays Presented to Marjorie Grene on the Occasion of Her seventy-fifth Birthday. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 89. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Wedin, Michael V. 1978. “Objects and Independence in the Tractatus.” in Proceedings of the 2nd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Wittgenstein and his Impact on Contemporary Thought, edited by Elisabeth Leinfellner, Werner Leinfellner, Hal Berghel, and André Hübner, pp. 107–113. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 2. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Wedin, Michael V. 1982. “Aristotle on the Range of the Principle of Non-Contradiction.” Logique et Analyse 25(97): 87–92.
Wedin, Michael V. 1984. “Singular Statements and Essentialism in Aristotle.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14(suppl. 10): 67–88.
Wedin, Michael V. 1986. “Tracking Aristotle’s Noûs.” in Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. Essays Presented to Marjorie Grene on the Occasion of Her seventy-fifth Birthday, edited by Alan Donagan, Anthony N. Perovich Jr., and Michael V. Wedin, pp. 167–199. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 89. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Wedin, Michael V. 1988. Mind and Imagination in Aristotle. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Wedin, Michael V. 1990. “What Objects Could Not Be.” in Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Wittgenstein – Towards a Re-Evaluation. Volume I, edited by Rudolf Haller and Johannes L. Brandl, pp. 51–63. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 19/1. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Wedin, Michael V. 1992a. “Trouble in Paradise? On the Alleged Incoherence of the Tractatus.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 42: 23–55. “Criss-crossing a Philosophical Landscape,” ed. by Joachim Schulte and Göran Sundholm.
Wedin, Michael V. 1992b. “Aristotle on the Mechanics of Thought.” in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy V. Aristotle’s Ontology, edited by Anthony Preus and John Peter Anton, pp. 245–272. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
Wedin, Michael V. 1994. “Aristotle on the Mind’s Self-Motion.” in Self-Motion. From Aristotle to Newton, edited by Mary Louise Gill and James G. Lennox, pp. 81–116. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Wedin, Michael V. 1995. “Keeping the Matter in Mind: Aristotle on the Passions and the Soul.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76(2–3). Reprinted in Lewis and Bolton (1996, 1–38).
Wedin, Michael V. 1996a. “Taking Stock of the Central Books: A Review of Aristotle: Metaphysics, Books Z and H, trans. with Commentary by David Bostock [Aristotle (1994)].” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 14, edited by C. C. W. Taylor, pp. 241–271. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wedin, Michael V. 1996b. “Subjects and Substance in Metaphysics Z 3.” in Aristoteles: Metaphysik – Die Substanzbücher (Z, H, \(\Theta\)), edited by Christof Rapp, pp. 41–74. Klassiker Auslegen n. 4. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Wedin, Michael V. 1996c. “Aristotle on How to Define a Psychological State.” Topoi 15(1): 11–24.
Wedin, Michael V. 1997. “The Strategy of Aristotle’s Categories.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79(1): 1–26.
Wedin, Michael V. 1999. “The Scope of Non-Contradiction: A Note on Aristotle’s ‘Elenctic’ Proof in ‘Metaphysics’ \(\Gamma 4\).” Apeiron 32(3): 231–242.
Wedin, Michael V. 2000a. Aristotle’s Theory of Substance. The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253080.001.0001.
Wedin, Michael V. 2000b. “Some Logical Problems in Metaphysics Gamma.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 19, edited by David Sedley, pp. 113–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wedin, Michael V. 2003. “A Curious Turn in Metaphysics Gamma: Protagoras and Strong Denial of the Principle of Non-Contradiction.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85(2): 107–130.
Wedin, Michael V. 2004. “On the Use and Abuse of Non-Contradiction: Aristotle’s Critique of Protagoras and Heraclitus in Metaphysics Gamma 5.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 26, edited by David Sedley, pp. 213–239. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wedin, Michael V. 2005. “Animadversions on Burnyeat’s Theaetetus: On the Logic of the Exquisite Argument.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 29, edited by David Sedley, pp. 171–192. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wedin, Michael V. 2009. “The Science and Axioms of Being.” in A Companion to Aristotle, edited by Georgios Anagnostopoulos, pp. 125–143. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444305661.
Wedin, Michael V. 2011. “Parmenides’ Three Ways and the Failure of the Ionian Interpretation.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 41, edited by Brad Inwood, pp. 1–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wedin, Michael V. 2014. Parmenides’ Grand Deduction. A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715474.001.0001.