David Widerker (widerker)

Zitiert in den folgenden Artikeln

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Schnall, Ira M. and Widerker, David. 2012. “The Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof.” Analysis 72(1): 25–36.
Widerker, David. 1977. “Epistemic Opacity Again.” Philosophical Studies 32(4): 355–358.
Widerker, David. 1981. “Identity, Indiscernibility and Geach.” Logique et Analyse 24(94): 211–221.
Widerker, David. 1987a. “Fatalism.” Logique et Analyse 30(119): 229–234.
Widerker, David. 1987b. “On an Argument for Incompatibilism .” Analysis 47(1): 37–41, doi:10.1093/analys/47.1.37.
Widerker, David. 1989a. “In Defense of Davidson’s Identity Thesis Regarding Action Individuation.” Dialectica 43(3): 281–288.
Widerker, David. 1989b. “Two Fallacious Objections to Adams’ Soft/Hard Fact Distinction.” Philosophical Studies 57(1): 103–107.
Widerker, David. 1991. “A Problem for the Eternity Solution.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29(2): 87–95.
Widerker, David. 1992. “Cartesian Intuitions and Anomalous Monism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 43: 95–100.
Widerker, David. 1996. “Contra Snapshot Ockhamism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39(2): 95–102.
Widerker, David. 2000. “Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 181–202. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Widerker, David. 2002a. “Farewell to the Direct Argument.” The Journal of Philosophy 99(6): 319–324.
Widerker, David. 2002b. “Responsibility and Frankfurt-Type Examples.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 323–336. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
Widerker, David. 2005. “Blameworthiness, Non-robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 292–306. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Widerker, David. 2006. “Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios.” The Journal of Philosophy 103(4): 163–187.
Widerker, David. 2009. “A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 12(2): 87–108.
Widerker, David. 2011. “Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 266–286. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
Widerker, David. 2016. “A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?” Analysis 76(3): 296–306.
Widerker, David and Goetz, Stewart C. 2013. “Fischer against the Dilemma Defence: The Defence Prevails.” Analysis 73(2): 283–295.
Widerker, David and Schnall, Ira M. 2015. “On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 94–115. London: Palgrave Macmillan.