Seth Yalcin (yalcin-s)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Knobe, Joshua and Yalcin, Seth. 2014. “Epistemic Modals and Context: Experimental Data.” Semantics and Pragmatics 7(10): 1–21.
Yalcin, Seth. 2007. “Epistemic Modals.” Mind 116(464): 983–1026.
Yalcin, Seth. 2009. “More on Epistemic Modals.” Mind 118(471): 785–793.
Yalcin, Seth. 2010. “Probability Operators.” Philosophy Compass 5(11): 916–937.
Yalcin, Seth. 2011. “Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality.” in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, pp. 295–332. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.
Yalcin, Seth. 2012a. “A Counterexample to Modus Tollens.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 41(6): 1001–1024, doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9228-4.
Yalcin, Seth. 2012b. “Bayesian Expressivism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112(2): 123–160.
Yalcin, Seth. 2012c. “Dynamic Semantics.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 253–279. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Yalcin, Seth. 2012d. “Context Probabilism.” in Logic, Language and Meaning. 18th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 2011. Revised Selected Papers, edited by Maria Aloni, Vadim Kimmelman, Florian Roelofsen, Galit W. Sassoon, Katrin Schulz, and Matthijs Westera, pp. 12–20. Berlin: Springer.
Yalcin, Seth. 2014. “Semantics and Metasemantics in the Context of Generative Grammar.” in Metasemantics. New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, edited by Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, pp. 17–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669592.001.0001.
Yalcin, Seth. 2015a. “Actually, Actually.” Analysis 75(2): 185–191.
Yalcin, Seth. 2015b. “Quantifying In from a Fregean Perspective.” The Philosophical Review 124(2): 207–253.
Yalcin, Seth. 2015c. “Epistemic Modality De Re.” Ergo 2(19): 475–527.
Yalcin, Seth. 2016. “Modalities of Normality.” in Deontic Modality, edited by Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman, pp. 230–255. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001.
Yalcin, Seth. 2018a. “Belief as Question-Sensitive.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97(1): 23–47.
Yalcin, Seth. 2018b. “Expressivism by Force.” in New Work on Speech Acts, edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris, and Matt Moss, pp. 400–430. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198738831.001.0001.
Yalcin, Seth. 2021. “Metasemantic Relationism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45: Doubt, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Yuval Avnur, pp. 541–560. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp2021111623.