Nomy Arpaly (arpaly)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Arpaly, Nomy. 2000. “On Acting Rationally Against One’s Best Judgment.” Ethics 110: 488–513.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. Unprincipled Virtue: an Inquiry into Moral Agency. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195152042.001.0001.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2004. “Which Autonomy?” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 173–188. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2005a. “How it is not ‘Just Like Diabetes’: Mental Disorders and the Moral Psychologist.” in Philosophical Issues 15: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 282–298. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2005b. “Comments on Doris (2002).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(3): 643–647.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2005c. “Responsibility, Applied Ethics, and Complex Autonomy Theories.” in Personal Autonomy. New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, edited by James Stacey Taylor, pp. 162–182. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2007a. “Reply to Pippin (2007).” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(3): 303–307.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2007b. “Unprincipled Virtue: Synopsis (Of Sorts) [précis of Arpaly (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 134(3): 429–431.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2007c. “Reply to Harman (2007), Stroud (2007) and Mason (2007).” Philosophical Studies 134(3): 457–465.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2011. “Open-Mindedness as a Moral Virtue.” American Philosophical Quarterly 48(1): 75–86.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2014. “Duty, Desire and the Good Person: Towards a Non-Aristotelian Account of Virtue.” in Philosophical Perspectives 28: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 59–74. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2015a. “Moral Worth and Normative Ethics.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume V, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 86–105. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.001.0001.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2015b. “Huckleberry Finn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance.” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New Essays, edited by Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith, pp. 141–156. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2017. “Moral Psychology’s Drinking Problem.” in Questions of Character, edited by Iskra Fileva, pp. 121–131. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.001.0001.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2018a. “It Ain’t Necessarily So.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XIII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 145–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823841.001.0001.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2018b. “Why Moral Ignorance is No Excuse.” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 2nd ed., pp. 658–662. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2021. “Three Dogmas of Agency Theory.” in The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang and Kurt L. Sylvan, pp. 187–195. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Arpaly, Nomy. 2023. “Practical Reasons to Believe, Epistemic Reasons to Act, and the Baffled Action Theorist.” in Philosophical Issues 33: The Philosophy of Action, edited by Michael McKenna and Carolina Sartorio, pp. 22–32. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12239.
Arpaly, Nomy and Schroeder, Timothy. 1999. “Praise, Blame, and the Whole Self.” Philosophical Studies 93(2): 161–188.
Arpaly, Nomy and Schroeder, Timothy. 2012. “Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.” The Philosophical Review 121(2): 209–239.
Arpaly, Nomy and Schroeder, Timothy. 2014. In Praise of Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199348169.001.0001.
Arpaly, Nomy and Schroeder, Timothy. 2015. “A Causal Theory of Acting for Reasons.” American Philosophical Quarterly 52(2): 103–114.
Schroeder, Timothy and Arpaly, Nomy. 2017. “Addiction, Habits, and Blame.” in Current Controversies in Bioethics, edited by S. Matthew Liao and Collin O’Neil, pp. 117–131. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.

Further References

Doris, John M. 2002. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2007. “Discussion of Arpaly (2003).” Philosophical Studies 134(3): 433–439.
Mason, Elinor. 2007. “Rationality and Morality: Thoughts on Unprincipled Virtue [on Arpaly (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 134(3): 441–448.
Pippin, Robert B. 2007. “What was Abstract Art? (From the Point of View of Hegel).” in Hegel and the Arts, edited by Stephen Houlgate, pp. 244–270. Topics in Historical Philosophy. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
Stroud, Sarah. 2007. “Moral Worth and Rationality as Acting on Good Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 134(3): 449–456.