Matthew S. Bedke (bedke)
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Bibliography
Bedke, Matthew S. 2008. “Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify.” American Philosophical Quarterly 45(3): 253–269.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2009a. “Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism from Amoralism.” Philosophical Studies 144(2): 189–209.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2009b. “Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90: 188–209.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2010a. “Rationalist Restrictions and External Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 151(1): 39–57.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2010b. “Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.” Philosophy Compass 5(12): 1069–1083.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2011. “Passing the Deontic Buck.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VI, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 128–152. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.001.0001.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2012a. “Against Normative Naturalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(1): 111–129.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2012b. “The Ought-Is Gap: Trouble for Hybrid Semantics.” The Philosophical Quarterly 62(249): 657–670.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2014a. “Ethics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Intuitions and Quasi-Realism.” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, edited by Matthew C. Haug, pp. 416–434. London: Routledge.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2014b. “A Menagerie of Duties? Normative Judgments are Not Beliefs about Non-Natural Properties.” American Philosophical Quarterly 51(3): 189–202.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2014c. “No Coincidence?” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IX, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 102–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.001.0001.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2018a. “Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XIII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 48–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823841.001.0001.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2018b. “Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 292–307. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.
Bedke, Matthew S. 2019. “Moral Intuition.” in The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, edited by Aaron Z. Zimmerman, Karen Jones, and Mark Timmons, pp. 360–374. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Deery, Oisı́n, Bedke, Matthew S. and Nichols, Shaun. 2013. “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume I, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 126–150. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.001.0001.