Shaun Nichols (nichols-s)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Chadha, Monima and Nichols, Shaun. 2019. “Self-Conscious Emotions Without a Self.” Philosophers’ Imprint 19(38).
Deery, Oisı́n, Bedke, Matthew S. and Nichols, Shaun. 2013. “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume I, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 126–150. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.001.0001.
Fiala, Brian, Arico, Adam J. and Nichols, Shaun. 2014. “You, Robot.” in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, edited by Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill, pp. 31–47. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Gill, Michael B. and Nichols, Shaun. 2008. “Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 143–163. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kamtekar, Rachana and Nichols, Shaun. 2019. “Agent-Regret and Accidental Agency.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: Moral Luck, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Andrew C. Khoury, pp. 181–202. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/misp.12112.
Klein, Stanley B. and Nichols, Shaun. 2012. “Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity.” Mind 121(483): 677–702.
Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun, eds. 2008. Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199927418.001.0001.
Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun. 2011. “Free Will and the Bounds of the Self.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 530–554. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun. 2017. “Experimental Philosophy.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/experimental-philosophy/.
Lombrozo, Tania, Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun. 2014a. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.001.0001.
Lombrozo, Tania, Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun. 2014b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume I, pp. 1–6. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.001.0001.
Lombrozo, Tania, Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun, eds. 2018a. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815259.001.0001.
Lombrozo, Tania, Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun. 2018b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume II, edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, pp. 1–5. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815259.001.0001.
Lombrozo, Tania, Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun, eds. 2020a. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. vol. III. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198852407.001.0001.
Lombrozo, Tania, Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun. 2020b. “Introduction.” in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume III, edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, pp. 1–5. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198852407.001.0001.
Lombrozo, Tania, Knobe, Joshua and Nichols, Shaun, eds. 2021. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. vol. IV. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192856890.001.0001.
Lopez, Theresa, Zamzow, Jennifer L., Gill, Michael B. and Nichols, Shaun. 2009. “Side Constraints and the Structure of Commonsense Ethics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 23: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 305–319. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Machery, Edouard, Mallon, Ron, Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 2004. “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style.” Cognition 92(3): B1–B12, doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2003.10.003.
Mallon, Ron, Machery, Edouard, Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 2009. “Against Arguments from Reference.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(2): 332–356.
Nichols, Shaun. 2000. “The Mind’s ‘I’ and the Theory of Mind’s ‘I’: Introspection and Two Concepts of Self.” Philosophical Topics 28(2): 171–200.
Nichols, Shaun. 2002. “How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism: Is It Irrational to Be Immoral?” The Monist 85(2): 285–303.
Nichols, Shaun. 2003. “Imagination and the Puzzles of Iteration.” Analysis 63: 182–187.
Nichols, Shaun. 2004a. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195169344.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun. 2004b. “Review of Currie and Ravenscroft (2002).” Mind 113(450): 329–334.
Nichols, Shaun. 2004c. “Imagining and Believing: The Promise of a Single Code.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62: 129–139.
Nichols, Shaun. 2005. “Innateness and Moral Psychology.” in The Innate Mind. Structure and Contents, edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen P. Stich, pp. 353–370. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun. 2006a. The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun. 2006b. “Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn’t Behave Like Believing.” Mind and Language 21(4): 459–474.
Nichols, Shaun. 2006c. “Introduction.” in The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, pp. 1–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun. 2006d. “Imaginative Blocks and Impossibility: An Essay in Modal Psychology.” in The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, pp. 237–256. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun. 2007a. “After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes.” in Philosophical Perspectives 21: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 405–428. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Nichols, Shaun. 2007b. “The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: Philosophy and the Empirical, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 260–270. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Nichols, Shaun. 2008a. “Sentimentalism Naturalized.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 255–274. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun. 2008b. “Sentiments, Intention, and Disagreement: Replies to Blair (2008) and D’Arms (2008).” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 291–302. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun. 2008c. “Moral Rationalism and Empirical Immunity.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 3. The Neuroscience of Morality. Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 395–408. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Nichols, Shaun. 2009. “The Propositional Imagination.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, pp. 360–370. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Nichols, Shaun. 2012. “The Indeterminist Intuition: Source and Status.” The Monist 95(2): 290–307.
Nichols, Shaun. 2015. Bound. Essays on Free Will and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291847.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun. 2017a. “The Essence of Mentalistic Agents.” Synthese 194(3): 809–825.
Nichols, Shaun. 2017b. “The Rationality of Psychological Essentialism.” in Experimental Metaphysics, edited by David Rose, pp. 117–134. Advances in Experimental Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Nichols, Shaun. 2017c. “Memory and Personal Identity.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, edited by Sven Bernecker and Kourken Michaelian, pp. 169–179. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Nichols, Shaun. 2019. “Moral Learning.” in The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, edited by Aaron Z. Zimmerman, Karen Jones, and Mark Timmons, pp. 124–138. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Nichols, Shaun. 2021. Rational Rules: Towards a Theory of Moral Learning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198869153.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun and Grantham, T. 2000. “Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness.” Philosophy of Science 67: 648–670.
Nichols, Shaun and Knobe, Joshua. 2007. “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.” Noûs 41(4): 663–685, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x.
Nichols, Shaun, Pinillos, Ángel N. and Mallon, Ron. 2016. “Ambiguous Reference.” Mind 125(497): 145–175.
Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 1998. “Rethinking Co-Cognition: A Reply to Heal.” Mind and Language 13: 499–512.
Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 1999. “Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Minds.” in Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, edited by Denis Fisette, pp. 199–216. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 62. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9193-5.
Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 2000. “A Cognitive Theory of Pretense.” Cognition 74: 115–147.
Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 2003a. Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford Cognitive Science Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198236107.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 2003b. “How to Read Your Own Mind: A Cognitive Theory of Self-Consciousness.” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 157–200. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun, Stich, Stephen P. and Leslie, Alan M. 1995. “Choice Effects and the Ineffectiveness of Simulation.” Mind and Language 10: 437–445.
Nichols, Shaun, Stich, Stephen P., Leslie, Alan M. and Klein, David. 1996. “Varieties of Off-Line Simulation.” in Theories of Theories of Mind, edited by Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, pp. 39–74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nichols, Shaun, Stich, Stephen P. and Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2003. “Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-epistemology.” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper, pp. 227–248. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
Prinz, Jesse J. and Nichols, Shaun. 2017. “Diachronic Identity and the Moral Self.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind, edited by Julian Kiverstein, pp. 449–464. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Stich, Stephen P. and Nichols, Shaun. 1993. “Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?” in Philosophical Issues 3: Science and Knowledge, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 225–270. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in Davies and Stone (1995, 123–158).
Stich, Stephen P. and Nichols, Shaun. 1995. “Second Thoughts on Simulation.” in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, edited by Martin Kinsey Davies and Tony Stone, pp. 87–108. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Stich, Stephen P. and Nichols, Shaun. 1997. “Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality, and Restricted Simulation.” Mind and Language 12: 297–326.
Stich, Stephen P. and Nichols, Shaun. 1998. “Theory Theory to the Max.” Mind and Language 13: 421–449.
Stich, Stephen P. and Nichols, Shaun. 2003. “Folk Psychology.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 235–255. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.
Weinberg, Jonathan M., Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 2001. “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.” Philosophical Topics 29(1–2): 429–460.
Zamzow, Jennifer L. and Nichols, Shaun. 2009. “Variations in Ethical Intuitions.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 368–388. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.

Further References

Blair, James. 2008. “Normative Theory or Theory of Mind? A Response to Nichols (2008a).” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 275–278. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Currie, Gregory and Ravenscroft, Ian. 2002. Recreative Minds: Image and Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238089.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin. 2008. “Sentimental Rules and Moral Disagreement: Comment on Nichols (2008a).” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 279–290. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Davies, Martin Kinsey and Stone, Tony, eds. 1995. Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.