Michael Bergmann (bergmann-m)

Citato nei seguenti articoli

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bergmann, Michael. 1996. “A New Argument from Actualism to Serious Actualism.” Noûs 30: 356–359.
Bergmann, Michael. 1999. “(Serious) Actualism and (Serious) Presentism.” Noûs 33(1): 118–132, doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00145.
Bergmann, Michael. 2000. “Deontology and Defeat.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 87–102.
Bergmann, Michael. 2002. “Commonsense Naturalism.” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, edited by James K. Beilby, pp. 61–90. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Bergmann, Michael. 2004a. “Externalist Justification Without Reliability.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 35–60. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Bergmann, Michael. 2004b. “What’s Not’ Wrong with Foundationalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 161–165.
Bergmann, Michael. 2004c. “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(3): 709–727.
Bergmann, Michael. 2006a. Justification without Awareness. A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael. 2006b. “A Dilemma for Internalism.” in Knowledge and Reality. Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, edited by Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson, and David A. Vander Laan, pp. 137–178. Philosophical Studies Series n. 103. Dordrecht: Springer.
Bergmann, Michael. 2006c. “Bonjour’s Dilemma [on BonJour and Sosa (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 131(3): 679–693.
Bergmann, Michael. 2006d. “Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed (2006).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1): 198–207.
Bergmann, Michael. 2007. “Is Klein an Infinitist about Doxastic Justification?” Philosophical Studies 134(1): 19–24.
Bergmann, Michael. 2008. “Externalist Responses to Skepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 504–532. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael. 2009a. “Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, edited by Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea, pp. 374–401. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bergmann, Michael. 2009b. “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure.” Episteme 6(3): 336–353.
Bergmann, Michael. 2011. “Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 123–134. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael. 2012. “Commonsense Skeptical Theism.” in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind. New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, edited by Kelly James Clark and Michael C. Rea, pp. 9–30. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael. 2013a. “Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings.” Philosophical Studies 166(1): 163–184.
Bergmann, Michael. 2013b. “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism.” in Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Christopher Tucker, pp. 154–179. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael. 2013c. “Is Plantinga a Friend of Evolutionary Science? [on Plantinga (2011)].” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5(3): 3–17.
Bergmann, Michael. 2014. “Skeptical Theism, Atheism, and Total Evidence Skepticism.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 209–220. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bergmann, Michael. 2015. “Religious Disagreement and Rational Demotion.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume VI, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 21–57. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722335.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael. 2017. “Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions.” in Religious Epistemology, edited by Stephen Law, pp. 19–43. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bergmann, Michael. 2021. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192898487.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael and Brower, Jeffrey E. 2006. “A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity).” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume II, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 357–386. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199290581.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael and Brower, Jeffrey E., eds. 2016. Reason and Faith. Themes from Richard Swinburne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732648.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael and Kain, Patrick, eds. 2014a. Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael and Kain, Patrick. 2014b. “Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Overview and Future Directions.” in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution, edited by Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain, pp. 1–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.001.0001.
Coppenger, Brett and Bergmann, Michael, eds. 2016. Intellectual Assurance. Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.001.0001.

Further References

BonJour, Laurence and Sosa, Ernest. 2003. Epistemic Justification. Great Debates in Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Plantinga, Alvin. 2011. Where the Conflict Really Lies. Science, Religion, and Naturalism. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812097.001.0001.
Reed, Baron. 2006. “Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1): 186–197.