Michael Blome-Tillmann (blometillmann)

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Ball, Brian and Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2013. “Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon.” Erkenntnis 78(6): 1317–1336.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2006. “A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 381–390.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2007a. “The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge.” Analysis 67(3): 214–219.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2007b. “Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 387–394.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2008a. “Conversational Implicature and the Cancellability Test.” Analysis 68(2): 156–160.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2008b. “The Indexicality of ‘Knowledge’ .” Philosophical Studies 138(1): 29–53.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2009a. “Knowledge and Presuppositions.” Mind 118(470): 241–294.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2009b. “Contextualism, Safety and Epistemic Relevance.” Philosophical Studies 143(3): 383–394.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2009c. “Moral Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109(3): 279–309.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2009d. “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(2): 315–331.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2012. “Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 104–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2013a. “Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them).” Philosophy Compass 8(2): 170–185.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2013b. “Knowledge and Implicatures.” Synthese 190(18): 4293–4319.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2013c. “Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 89–100.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2014. Knowledge and Presuppositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.001.0001.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2015a. “Solving the Moorean Puzzle.” Philosophical Studies 172(2): 493–514.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2015b. “Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.” Thought 4(2): 102–112.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2015c. “Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View.” Mind 124(496): 1221–1230.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2016. “Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, edited by Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw, pp. 96–113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9780511820076.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2017a. “ ‘More Likely Than Not’: Knowledge First and the Role of Bare Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 278–292. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2017b. “Gradability and Knowledge.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 348–358. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2018. “Knowledge as Contextual.” in The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History, Volume 4: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington and Markos Valaris, pp. 175–194. London: Bloomsbury Academic, doi:10.5040/9781474258814.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2020. “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, High-Stakes/Low-Stakes Cases, and Presupposition Suspension.” Episteme 17(2): 249–254.
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2022. The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716303.001.0001.