Selmer Bringsford (bringsford)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Arkoudas, Konstantine and Bringsford, Selmer. 2014. “Philosophical Foundations.” in The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence, edited by Keith Frankish and William M. Ramsey, pp. 34–63. Cambridge Handbooks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bringsford, Selmer. 1985. “Are there Set Theoretic Possible Worlds?” Analysis 45(1): 64.
Bringsford, Selmer. 1986. “Swinburne’s Argument from Consciousness.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 19(3): 127–143.
Bringsford, Selmer. 1989.“Grim (1988) on Logic and Omniscience.” Analysis 49(4): 186–189.
Bringsford, Selmer. 1991. “Is the Connectionist-Logicist Debate One of AI’s Wonderful Red Herrings?” Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 3: 319–349.
Bringsford, Selmer. 1992. What Robots Can and Can’t Be. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Bringsford, Selmer. 1994. “Computation, among Other Things, is beneath Us.” Minds and Machines 4: 469–488.
Bringsford, Selmer. 1995. “Could, how Could we Tell if, and Xhould – Androids have Inner Lives?” in Android Epistemology, edited by Kenneth M. Ford, Clark N. Glymour, and Patrick J. Hayes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Second edition: Ford, Glymour and Hayes (2006).
Bringsford, Selmer. 1999. “The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 41–69.
Bringsford, Selmer. 2001. “Creativity, the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test.” Minds and Machines 11: 3–27.
Bringsford, Selmer. 2008. “If I Were Judge.” in Parsing the Turing Test: Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer, edited by Roger Epstein, Gary Roberts, and Grace Beber, pp. 89–102. Berlin: Springer.
Bringsford, Selmer. 2010. “Meeting Floridi’s Challenge to Artificial Intelligence from the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness.” Metaphilosophy 41(3): 292–312. Reprinted in Allo (2010, 45–65).
Bringsford, Selmer. 2016. “Information in the Philosophy of AI and the Symbol Grounding Problem.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Information, edited by Luciano Floridi, pp. 107–119. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Bringsford, Selmer and Arkoudas, Konstantine. 2006. “On the Provability, Veracity, and AI-Relevance of the Church-Turing Thesis.” in Church’s Thesis After 70 Years, edited by Adam Olszewski, Jan Woleński, and Robert Janusz, pp. 66–118. Ontos Mathematical Logic n. 1. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Bringsford, Selmer, Caporale, Clarke and Noel, Ron. 2000. “Animals, Zombanimals, and the Total Turing Test.” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9(4): 397–418.
Bringsford, Selmer and Ferrucci, David A., eds. 2000. Artificial Intelligence and Literary Creativity: Inside the Mind of BRUTUS, a Storytelling Machine. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Bringsford, Selmer and Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar. 2018. “Artificial Intelligence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/artificial-intelligence/.
Bringsford, Selmer and Noel, Ron. 1998. “Why did Evolution Engineer Consciousness?” in Evolving Consciousness, edited by Gregory R. Mulhauser. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Bringsford, Selmer and Yang, Yingrui. 2003. “Cognitive Illusions and the Welcome Psychologism of Logicist Artificial Intelligence.” in Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy, edited by Dale Jacquette, 1st ed., pp. 289–312. Philosophical Studies Series n. 91. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Bringsford, Selmer and Zenzen, Michael J. 1997. “Cognition is Not Computation: The Argument from Irreversibility.” Synthese 113: 285–320.
Govindarajalulu, Naveen Sundar, Bringsford, Selmer and Taylor, Joshua. 2015. “Proof Verification and Proof Discovery for Relativity.” Synthese 192(7): 2077–2094.

Further References

Allo, Patrick, ed. 2010. Putting Information First. Luciano Floridi and the Philosophy of Information. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444396836.
Grim, Patrick. 1988. “Logic and Limits of Knowledge and Truth.” Noûs 22(3): 341–367, doi:10.2307/2215708.