Matthew Chrisman (chrisman-m)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bar-On, Dorit and Chrisman, Matthew. 2009. “Ethical Neo-Expressivism.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 133–166. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bar-On, Dorit, Chrisman, Matthew and Sias, James. 2014. “(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 223–247. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
Carter, J. Adam and Chrisman, Matthew. 2012. “Is Epistemic Expressivism Incompatible with Inquiry?” Philosophical Studies 159(3): 323–339.
Charlow, Nate and Chrisman, Matthew, eds. 2016a. Deontic Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001.
Charlow, Nate and Chrisman, Matthew. 2016b. “Introduction.” in Deontic Modality, edited by Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2007. “From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism.” Philosophical Studies 135(2): 225–254.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2008a. “A Dilemma for Moral Fictionalism [discussion of Kalderon (2005)].” Philosophical Books 49(1): 4–13.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2008b. “Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(2): 334–358.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2009. “Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge.” Philosophers' imprint 9(3).
Chrisman, Matthew. 2010a. “From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism.” in Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 112–128. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2010b. “Constructivism, Expressivism and Ethical Knowledge.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18(3): 331–353.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2011a. “Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Theory of Meaning.” in New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael Sean Brady, pp. 103–125. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9780230294899.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2011b. “Ethical Expressivism.” in The Continuum Companion to Ethics, edited by Christian B. Miller, pp. 29–54. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Republished as Miller (2015).
Chrisman, Matthew. 2012a. “On the Meaning of ‘Ought’ .” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 304–332. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.001.0001.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2012b. “ ‘Ought’ and Control.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(3): 433–451.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2012c. “Epistemic Expressivism.” Philosophy Compass 7(2): 118–126.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2012d. “The Normative Evaluation of Belief and the Aspectual Classification of Belief and Knowledge Attributions.” The Journal of Philosophy 109(10): 588–612.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2015. “Knowing What One Ought to Do.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115(2): 167–186.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2016a. The Meaning of “Ought.” Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199363001.001.0001.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2016b. “Metanormative Theory and the Meaning of Deontic Modals.” in Deontic Modality, edited by Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman, pp. 395–430. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2018a. “Conceptual Role Accounts of Meaning in Metaethics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, pp. 260–274. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2018b. “Two Nondescriptivist Views of Normative and Evaluative Statements.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(3–4): 405–424.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2019. “What is a Theory of Normative Concepts For?” in Expressivisms, Knowledge and Truth, edited by Marı́a José Frápolli, pp. 63–85. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chrisman, Matthew. 2022. Belief, Agency, and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192898852.001.0001.
Chrisman, Matthew and Hubbs, Graham. 2021. “Protest and Speech Act Theory.” in The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo and Rachel Katharine Sterken, pp. 179–192. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781003164869.

Further References

Kalderon, Mark Eli. 2005. Moral Fictionalism. Lines of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275977.001.0001.