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Dorit Bar-On (baron-do)

Email: dbar(at)email.unc.edu

Cited in the following articles

Self-Knowledge and Interpersonal Reasoning

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Bibliography

    Bar-On, Dorit. 1990. “Justifying Beliefs: The Dream Hypothesis and Gratuitous Entities.” in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, edited by Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross, pp. 141–146. Philosophical Studies Series n. 48. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 1994. “Conceptual Relativism and Translation.” in Language, Mind and Epistemology. On Donald Davidson’s Philosophy, edited by Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt, and Alexander Ulfig, pp. 145–170. Synthese Library n. 241. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 1995. “ ‘Meaning’ Reconstructed: Grice and the Naturalizing of Semantics.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76: 83–116.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2000. “Speaking My Mind.” Philosophical Topics 28(2): 1–34.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2004. Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199276285.001.0001.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2009. “Critical Notice of Evnine (2008).” Philosophical Books 50(1): 1–14.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2010a. “Précis of Bar-On (2004).” Acta Analytica 25(1): 1–7.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2010b. “Avowals: Expression, Security, and Knowledge: Reply to Matthew Boyle, David Rosenthal, and Maura Tumulty [on Bar-On (2004)].” Acta Analytica 25(1): 47–63.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2010c. “Expressing as ‘Showing What’s Within’: On Green (2008).” Philosophical Books 51(4): 212–227.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2011. “Neo-Expressivism: Avowals’ Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge.” in Self-Knowledge, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, pp. 189–201. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2012a. “Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 189–211. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2012b. “Expression, Truth, and Reality: Some Variations on Themes from Wright.” in The Self and Self-Knowledge, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 162–193. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.001.0001.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2013. “Expressive Communication and Continuity Skepticism.” The Journal of Philosophy 110(6): 293–330.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2015. “Expression: Acts, Products, and Meaning.” in Meaning without Representation. Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism, edited by Steven A. Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams, pp. 180–209. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.001.0001.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2016a. “Sociality, Expression, and This Thing called Language.” Inquiry 59(1): 56–79.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2016b. “Communicative Intentions, Expressive Communication, and Origins of Meaning.” in, pp. 301–312.
    Bar-On, Dorit. 2019. “Neo-Expressivism: (Self-)Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth.” in Expressivisms, Knowledge and Truth, edited by Marı́a José Frápolli, pp. 11–34. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Chrisman, Matthew. 2009. “Ethical Neo-Expressivism.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 133–166. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Bar-On, Dorit, Chrisman, Matthew and Sias, James. 2014. “(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 223–247. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
    Bar-On, Dorit, Horisk, Claire and Lycan, William G. 2000. “Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.” Philosophical Studies 101(1): 1–28. Reprinted in Armour-Garb and Beall (2005, 321–343).
    Bar-On, Dorit, Horisk, Claire and Lycan, William G. 2005. “Postscript to [the reprint of] Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan (2000).” in Deflationary Truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, pp. 344–352. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Long, Douglas C. 2001. “Avowals and First-Person Privilege.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(2): 311–335.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Long, Douglas C. 2014. “Knowing Selves: Expression, Truth and Knowledge.” in Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, edited by Brie Gertler, pp. 179–212. Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315245997.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Moore, Richard. 2016. “Pragmatic Interpretation and Signaler-receiver Asymmetries in Animal Communication.” in, pp. 291–300.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Nolfi, Kate. 2016. “Belief Self-Knowledge.” Oxford Philosophy Handbooks Online, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.51.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Risjord, Mark W. 1992. “Is there such a Thing as a Language?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22(2): 163–190.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Sias, James. 2013. “Varieties of Expressivism.” Philosophy Compass 8(8): 699–713.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Simmons, Keith. 2006. “Deflationism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 607–631. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
    Bar-On, Dorit and Simmons, Keith. 2007. “The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth.” in Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, pp. 61–89. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 6. London: Routledge.
    Sias, James and Bar-On, Dorit. 2016. “Emotions and Their Expressions.” in The Expression of Emotion. Philosophical, Psychological and Legal Perspectives, edited by Catharine Abell and Joel Smith, pp. 46–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781316275672.

Further References