David Christensen (christensen-d)
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Philosophers' ImprintCited in the following articles
A Generalization of the Reflection Principle, What is the Point of Persistent Disputes?Contributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Christensen, David. 1991. “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs .” The Philosophical Review 100(2): 229–247, doi:10.2307/2185301.
Christensen, David. 1992. “Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections.” Analysis 52: 163–168.
Christensen, David. 1993. “Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53(2): 301–321.
Christensen, David. 1996. “Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers.” The Journal of Philosophy 93(9): 480–479.
Christensen, David. 1999. “Measuring Confirmation.” The Journal of Philosophy 96(9): 437–461.
Christensen, David. 2000. “Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality .” The Philosophical Review 109(3): 349–371, doi:10.1215/00318108-109-3-349.
Christensen, David. 2004. Putting Logic in its Place. Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199263256.001.0001.
Christensen, David. 2007a. “Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume II, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 3–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Christensen, David. 2007b. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.” The Philosophical Review 116(2): 187–217, doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-035.
Christensen, David. 2007c. “Epistemic Self-Respect.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 319–337, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x.
Christensen, David. 2007d. “Three Questions about Leplin’s Reliabilism.” Philosophical Studies 134(1): 43–50.
Christensen, David. 2009. “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.” Philosophy Compass 4(5): 756–767.
Christensen, David. 2010a. “Higher-Order Evidence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81(1): 185–215, doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x.
Christensen, David. 2010b. “Rational Reflection.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 121–140. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00187.x.
Christensen, David. 2011. “Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism.” Philosophers' imprint 11(6).
Christensen, David. 2012. “The Problem of das Man – A Simmelian Solution.” Inquiry 55(3): 262–288.
Christensen, David. 2013. “Epistemic Modesty Defended.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 77–97. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Christensen, David. 2014. “Disagreement and Public Controversy.” in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 142–166. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Christensen, David. 2016. “Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia.” Episteme 13(4): 397–422.
Christensen, David. 2019. “Formulating Independence.” in Higher-Order Evidence. New Essays, edited by Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 13–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
Christensen, David and Kornblith, Hilary. 1997. “Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a priori.” Philosophical Studies 86: 1–20.
Christensen, David and Lackey, Jennifer, eds. 2013a. The Epistemology of Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Christensen, David and Lackey, Jennifer. 2013b. “Introduction.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 1–7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Further References
Nozick, Robert. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.