Jennifer Lackey (lackey-j)

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Bibliography

Christensen, David and Lackey, Jennifer, eds. 2013a. The Epistemology of Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Christensen, David and Lackey, Jennifer. 2013b. “Introduction.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 1–7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 1999. “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49(197): 471–490.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2003. “A Minimal Expression of Non–reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Noûs 37(4): 706–723.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2005a. “Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(3): 636–658.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2005b. “Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection.” Philosophical Studies 126(2): 163–190.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2006a. “Knowing from Testimony.” Philosophy Compass 1(5): 432–448.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2006b. “Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck.” The Philosophical Quarterly 56(223).
Lackey, Jennifer. 2006c. “Learning from Words.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1): 77–101.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2006d. “Introduction.” in The Epistemology of Testimony, edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, pp. 1–23. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2006e. “It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” in The Epistemology of Testimony, edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, pp. 160–191. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2007a. “Norms of Assertion.” Noûs 41(4): 594–626, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00664.x.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2007b. “Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor (2007).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(1): 209–219.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2007c. “Why we Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything we Know.” Synthese 158(3): 345–361, doi:10.1002/9781119420828.ch13.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2008a. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2008b. “What Luck is Not.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2): 255–267.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2009. “Knowledge and Credit.” Philosophical Studies 142(1): 27–42, doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9304-3.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2010a. “What should we Do When we Disagree?” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume III, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 274–293. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2010b. “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.” in Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 298–325. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2010c. “Acting on Knowledge.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 361–382. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2011a. “Testimonial Knowledge.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 316–325. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2011b. “Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge.” in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Herman Cappelen, pp. 251–276. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2012. “Group Knowledge Attribution.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 243–269. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2013a. “Lies and Deception: an Unhappy Divorce.” Analysis 73(2): 236–248, doi:10.1093/analys/ant006.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2013b. “Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 243–268. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2013c. “Deficient Testimonial Knowledge.” in Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, edited by Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard, pp. 30–52. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 51. London: Routledge.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2013d. “The Virtues of Testimony.” in Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John Turri, pp. 193–204. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
Lackey, Jennifer, ed. 2014a. Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2014b. “Socially Extended Knowledge.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 282–298. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2014c. “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously.” in Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, edited by Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, pp. 299–316. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2014d. “Introduction.” in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2014e. “A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony.” in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 64–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2015. “Reliability and Knowledge in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Episteme 12(2): 203–208.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2016a. “What is Justified Group Belief ?” The Philosophical Review 125(3): 341–396.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2016b. “To Preempt or Not To Preempt.” Episteme 13(4): 571–576.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2017. “Collective Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, edited by Marija Jankovic and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 196–208. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Lackey, Jennifer, ed. 2018a. Academic Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198791508.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2018b. “Experts and Peer Disagreement.” in Knowledge, Belief, and God. New Insights in Religious Epistemology, edited by Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz, pp. 228–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198798705.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2018c. “Group Lies.” in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, edited by Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke, pp. 262–284. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198743965.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2019. “Selfless Assertions.” in The Oxford Handbook of Lying, edited by Jörg Meibauer, pp. 244–251. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.18.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2020a. The Epistemology of Groups. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199656608.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2020b. “Assertoric Quality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 625–642. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer, ed. 2021a. The Epistemology of Groups. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833659.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2021b. “Norms of Criminal Conviction.” in Philosophical Issues 31: Law and Epistemology, edited by Alexander A. Guerrero, pp. 188–209. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12199.
Lackey, Jennifer. 2023. Criminal Testimonial Injustice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192864109.001.0001.
Lackey, Jennifer and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2006. The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.001.0001.

Further References

Senor, Thomas D. 2007. “Preserving Preservationism: A Reply to Lackey (2006c).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(1): 199–208.