Nevin Climenhaga (climenhaga)
Cited in the following articles
If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?Contributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Climenhaga, Nevin. 2013. “A Problem for the Alternative Difference Measure of Confirmation.” Philosophical Studies 164(3): 643–651.
Climenhaga, Nevin. 2017. “Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent.” The Journal of Philosophy 114(5): 251–273.
Climenhaga, Nevin. 2018. “Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.” Mind 127(505): 69–104, doi:10.1093/mind/fzw032.
Climenhaga, Nevin. 2024. “Evidence and Inductive Inference.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 435–450. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.