Annalisa Coliva (coliva)

Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Baghramian, Maria and Coliva, Annalisa. 2020. Relativism. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429343308.
Belleri, Delia and Coliva, Annalisa. 2018. “The Gettier Problem and Context.” in The Gettier Problem, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 78–95. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2003a. “The First Person: Error through Misidentification, the Split between Speaker’s and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee.” The Journal of Philosophy 100(8): 416–432.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2003b. “The Argument from the Finer-Grained Content of Colour Experiences.” Dialectica 57(1): 57–70.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2003c. “Review of Paternoster (2001).” Dialectica 57(1): 92–94.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2006. “Error through misidentification: some varieties.” The Journal of Philosophy 103(8): 407–425.
Coliva, Annalisa, ed. 2007a. Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi. Roma: Carocci editore S.p.a.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2007b. “Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno.” in Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 255–280. Roma: Carocci editore S.p.a.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2008. “The Paradox of Moore’s Proof of an External World.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(231): 234–243.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2010a. Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. History of Analytic Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2010b. “Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?” Philosophical Investigations 33(1): 1–23.
Coliva, Annalisa, ed. 2012a. Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
Coliva, Annalisa, ed. 2012b. The Self and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.001.0001.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2012c. “Introduction.” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 1–14. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2012d. “Introduction.” in The Self and Self-Knowledge, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.001.0001.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2012e. “Moore’s Proof, Liberals, and Conservatives – Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way?” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 323–351. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2012f. “One Variety of Self-Knowledge: Constitutivism as Constructivism.” in The Self and Self-Knowledge, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 212–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.001.0001.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2012g. “Which ‘Key to All Mythologies’ about the Self? A Note on Where the Illusions of Transcendence Come from and How to Resist Them.” in Immunity to Error through Misidentification, edited by Simon Prosser and François Récanati, pp. 22–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2012h. “Critical Notice of Burge (2010).” Disputatio 4(33): 525–530.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2012i. “Varieties of Failure (of Warrant Transmission: What Else?!).” Synthese 189(2): 221–234.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2012j. “Human Diagrammatic Reasoning and Seeing-As.” Synthese 186(1): 121–148.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2013a. “Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Coliva (2010a).” Philosophia 41(1): 1–12.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2013b. “Replies [to Moyal-Sharrock (2013), Boult and Pritchard (2013), Kusch (2013), Leonardi (2013) and Tripodi (2013)].” Philosophia 41(1): 81–96.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2014. “Moderatism, Transmission Failures, Closure, and Humean Scepticism.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 248–273. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2015a. Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2015b. “How to Commit Moore’s Paradox.” The Journal of Philosophy 112(4): 169–192.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2016a. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2016b. “Review of Cassam (2014).” Analysis 76(2): 246–252.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2016c. “How to Perceive Reasons.” Episteme 13(1): 77–88.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2017a. “Anna Boncompagni, Wittgenstein and Pragmatism.” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6(4): 24–27.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2017b. “How to Be a Pluralist About Self-Knowledge.” in Epistemic Pluralism, edited by Annalisa Coliva and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, pp. 253–283. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2018a. “Review of Garcı́a-Carpintero and Torre (2016).” Analysis 78(4): 780–784.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2018b. “What Anti-Realism About Hinges Could Possibly Be.” in Metaepistemology. Realism and Anti-Realism, edited by Christos Kyriacou and Robin McKenna, pp. 267–288. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2018c. “Practical Knowledge and Linguistic Competence.” in Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, edited by Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi, and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 337–356. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2019. “Testimonial Hinges.” in Philosophical Issues 29: Epistemology, edited by Lisa Miracchi, pp. 53–68. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12140.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2020. “Relativism and Hinge Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch, pp. 320–328. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351052306.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2021a. “Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on Common Sense and Metaphysical Analysis.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29(5): 914–934, doi:10.1080/09608788.2021.1936447.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2021b. “Doubts, Philosophy, and Therapy.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45: Doubt, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Yuval Avnur, pp. 155–177. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp20219135.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2022. Wittgenstein Rehinged: The Relevance of On Certainty for Contemporary Epistemology. London: Anthem Press.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2023. “ ‘You Just Believe That Because…It’s a Hinge’ .” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47: Genealogy of Belief: You Just Believe That Because …, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Yuval Avnur, pp. 53–71. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp2023102740.
Coliva, Annalisa and Belleri, Delia. 2013. “Some Observations on François Recanati’s Mental Files.” Disputatio 5(36): 107–117.
Coliva, Annalisa and Doulas, Louis, eds. forthcoming. Analysis, Common Sense, and Public Philosophy: Themes from the Philosophy of Susan Stebbing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coliva, Annalisa, Leonardi, Paolo and Moruzzi, Sebastiano, eds. 2018a. Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa, Leonardi, Paolo and Moruzzi, Sebastiano. 2018b. “Introduction.” in Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, edited by Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi, and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 1–6. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa and Moruzzi, Sebastiano. 2012. “Truth Relativists Can’t Trump Moral Progress.” Analytic Philosophy 53(1): 48–57.
Coliva, Annalisa and Moruzzi, Sebastiano. 2014. “Faultless Disagreement and the Equal Validity Paradox.” in New Frontiers in Truth, edited by Fabio Bacchini, Stefano Caputo, and Massimo Dell’Utri, pp. 38–62. Newcastle upon Tye: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Coliva, Annalisa and Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding, eds. 2017a. Epistemic Pluralism. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Coliva, Annalisa and Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding. 2017b. “Introduction.” in Epistemic Pluralism, edited by Annalisa Coliva and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, pp. 1–22. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle, Munz, Volker A. and Coliva, Annalisa, eds. 2015. Mind, Language and Action. Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 22. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Further References

Boult, Cameron and Pritchard, Duncan. 2013. “Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo [on Coliva (2010a)].” Philosophia 41(1): 27–35.
Burge, Tyler. 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581405.001.0001.
Cassam, Quassim. 2014. Self-Knowledge for Humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657575.001.0001.
Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel and Torre, Stephan, eds. 2016. About Oneself. De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001.
Kusch, Martin. 2013. “Annalisa Coliva on Wittgenstein and Epistemic Relativism [on Coliva (2010a)].” Philosophia 41(1): 37–49.
Leonardi, Paolo. 2013. “Wittgenstein and Moore [on Coliva (2010a)].” Philosophia 41(1): 51–61.
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle. 2013. “On Coliva’s Judgmental Hinges [on Coliva (2010a)].” Philosophia 41(1): 13–25.
Paternoster, Alfredo. 2001. Linguaggio e visione. Pisa: Edizioni ETS.
Tripodi, Paolo. 2013. “Wittgenstein on the Gulf between Believers and Non-Believers [on Coliva (2010a)].” Philosophia 41(1): 63–79.