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Duncan Pritchard (pritchard-d)

d.h.pritchard(at)stir.ac.uk

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Bibliography

    Bernecker, Sven and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2011. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Boult, Cameron and Pritchard, Duncan. 2013. “Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo [on Coliva (2010)].” Philosophia 41(1): 27–35.
    Brady, Michael Sean and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2003. Moral and Epistemic Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Brady, Michael Sean and Pritchard, Duncan. 2005. “Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(219).
    Brady, Michael Sean and Pritchard, Duncan. 2006. “Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 130(1): 1–8.
    Carter, J. Adam, Clark, Andy, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Spyridon Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2018a. Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801764.001.0001.
    Carter, J. Adam, Clark, Andy, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Spyridon Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2018b. Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198769811.001.0001.
    Carter, J. Adam, Clark, Andy, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Spyridon Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan. 2018c. “Introduction.” in Socially Extended Epistemology, edited by J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801764.001.0001.
    Carter, J. Adam, Kallestrup, Jesper, Palermos, Spyridon Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan. 2014. “Varieties of Externalism.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 63–109. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Carter, J. Adam and Pritchard, Duncan. 2015a. “Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck.” Noûs 49(3): 440–453.
    Carter, J. Adam and Pritchard, Duncan. 2015b. “Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(4): 799–816.
    Carter, J. Adam and Pritchard, Duncan. 2016. “Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.” Philosophical Studies 173(4): 969–990.
    Carter, J. Adam and Pritchard, Duncan. 2017a. “Inference to the Best Explanation and Epistemic Circularity.” in Best Explanations. New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, edited by Kevin McCain and Ted Poston, pp. 133–149. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746904.001.0001.
    Carter, J. Adam and Pritchard, Duncan. 2017b. “Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding.” in Explaining Understanding. New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Stephen R. Grimm, Christoph Baumberger, and Sabine Ammon, pp. 272–292. London: Routledge.
    Carter, J. Adam and Pritchard, Duncan. 2017c. “Epistemic Situationism, Epistemic Dependence, and the Epistemology of Education.” in Epistemic Situationism, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Mark Alfano, pp. 168–191. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688234.001.0001.
    Greenough, Patrick and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2009a. Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001.
    Greenough, Patrick and Pritchard, Duncan. 2009b. “Introduction.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 1–4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001.
    Haddock, Adrian, Millar, Alan and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2009. Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
    Haddock, Adrian, Millar, Alan and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2010. Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
    Hendricks, Vincent F. and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2007. New Waves in Epistemology. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Hendricks, Vincent F. and Pritchard, Duncan. 2008. Epistemology: 5 Questions. New York: Automatic Press / VIP.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2012. “Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 84–103.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2013a. “Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence.” in Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, edited by Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard, pp. 209–226. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 51. London: Routledge.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2013b. “The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology.” in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy. The New Aristotelianism, edited by John Greco and Ruth Groff, pp. 248–269. London: Routledge.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2014a. “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth.” European Journal of Philosophy 22(3): 335–357.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2014b. Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2016a. “From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility.” Res Philosophica 93(3): 533–552.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2016b. “Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.” in Performance Epistemology. Foundations and Applications, edited by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, pp. 31–50. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.001.0001.
    Kallestrup, Jesper and Pritchard, Duncan. 2017. “Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-Individualism, and Knowledge-First Epistemology.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 200–222. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
    Kelp, Christoph and Pritchard, Duncan. 2009. “Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning.” in, pp. 324–338.
    Massimi, Michaela and Pritchard, Duncan. 2014. “What is this Thing Called Science? A Very Brief Philosophical Overview.” in Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone, edited by Michaela Massimi, pp. 1–13. London: Routledge.
    Millar, Alan, Haddock, Adrian and Pritchard, Duncan. 2009. “Introduction.” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 1–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
    Neta, Ram and Pritchard, Duncan. 2007. “McDowell and the New Evil Genius.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(2): 381–396.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2000a. “Closure and Context.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2000b. “Is ‘God Exists’ a ‘Hinge Proposition’ of Religious Belief?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47(3): 129–140.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2001a. “McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge Across Known Entailments.” Synthese 128: 1–24.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2001b. “Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent.” Dialectica 55(4): 327–350.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2001c. “Scepticism and Dreaming.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 28(1–4): 373–390.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2002a. “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10(3): 283–307.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2002b. “Recent Work on Radical Skepticism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 39(3): 215–257.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2002c. “Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 64: 19–55.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2003. “McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism.” European Journal of Philosophy 11(3): 273–294.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2004a. “Epistemic Deflationism.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 42(1): 103–134.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2004b. “The Epistemology of Testimony.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 326–348. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2005a. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019928038X.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2005b. “Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(2): 185–205.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2005c. “Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism.” Acta Analytica 20(2): 3–25.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2005d. “Neo-Mooreanism Versus Contextualism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69: 1–24.  “Epistemological Contextualism,” ed. by Martijn Blaauw.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2005e. “The Structure of Sceptical Arguments.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(218).
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2005f. “Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 8(3): 229–243.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2005g. “Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism.” in Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, edited by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, pp. 189–224. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2006a. What is this thing called Knowledge? London: Routledge.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2006b. “Review of Alston (2005).” Mind 115(458): 387–387.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2006c. “Moral and Epistemic Luck.” Metaphilosophy 37(1): 1–25.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2006d. “Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck.” Philosophical Studies 130(1): 35–45.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2007a. “How to be a Neo-Moorean.” in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 68–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2007b. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2007c. “Recent Work on Epistemic Value.” American Philosophical Quarterly 44(2): 85–110.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2008a. “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism.” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 283–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2008b. “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited.” Metaphilosophy 39(1): 66–88.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2008c.“Greco (2008) on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232): 437–447, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.550.x.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2008d. “Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 77: 325–339.  “Knowledge and Questions,” ed. by Franck Lihoreau.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2008e. “Certainty and Skepticism.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 58–67. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00137.x.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2008f. “Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 82: 19–41.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2008g. “Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 437–455. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2009a. Knowledge. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Second edition: Pritchard (2016a).
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2009b. “Defusing Epistemic Relativism.” Synthese 166(2): 397–412.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2009c. “Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp (2009).” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17(4): 589–596.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2009d. “Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.” in Epistemology, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 19–43. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2009e. “Apt Performance and Epistemic Value [on Sosa (2007)].” Philosophical Studies 143(3): 407–416, doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9340-7.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2009f. “Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge [on Cassam (2007)].” Analysis 69(2): 317–325.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2009g. “Knowledge.” in Central Issues of Philosophy, edited by John Shand, pp. 24–36. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2010a. “Absurdity, Angst, and the Meaning of Life.” The Monist 93(1): 3–16.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2010b. “Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination.” Noûs 44(2): 245–268.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2010c. What is this thing called Knowledge? 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2010d. “Knowledge and Understanding.” in The Nature and Value of Knowledge. Three Investigations, pp. 3–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Fairweather (2014, 315–328), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2010e. “Contextualism, Skepticism, and Warranted Assertability Maneuvers.” in Knowledge and Skepticism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 85–104. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 5. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014083.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2011a. “Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem.” in Philosophical Issues 21: The Epistemology of Perception, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 434–455. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2011b. “Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability, and Wittgensteinian Epistemology.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 266–285. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2011c. “Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 235–253. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2011d. “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism.” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 193–202. The New Synthese Historical Library n. 70. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2011e. “Wittgenstein on Scepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, edited by Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn, pp. 523–549. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199287505.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2011f. “What is the Swamping Problem?” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 244–259. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2012a. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2012b. “Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of our Believing.” Synthese 189(2): 255–272.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2012c. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.” The Journal of Philosophy 109(3): 247–279, doi:10.5840/jphil201210939.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2012d. “In Defence of Modest Anti-Luck Epistemology.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 173–192. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.014.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2013a. “Disagreement, Skepticism, and Track-Record Arguments.” in Disagreement and Skepticism, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 150–168. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 46. London: Routledge.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2013b. “Davidson and Radical Skepticism.” in A Companion to Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 521–532. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328408.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2014a. “The Modal Account of Luck.” Metaphilosophy 45(4–5): 594–619. Reprinted in Pritchard and Whittington (2015a, 143–168).
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2014b. “Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 190–212. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2014c. “Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 155–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2014d. “Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 152–163. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2014e. “Re-Evaluating the Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology.” in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Owen Flanagan Jr., pp. 143–154. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2014f. “Sceptical Intuitions.” in Intuitions, edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom, pp. 213–231. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2014g. “Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good.” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 112–129. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2015a. Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan, ed. 2015b. What is this thing called Philosophy? London: Routledge.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2015c. “Epistemic Dependence.” in Philosophical Perspectives 29: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 305–324. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2015d. “Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem.” Philosophical Studies 172(1): 93–111.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2015e. “Précis of Pritchard (2012a).” Analysis 75(4): 589–595.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2015f. “Responses to Critics [on Zalabardo (2015), Littlejohn (2015) and Schönbaumsfeld (2015)].” Analysis 75(4): 627–637.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2015g. “Risk.” Metaphilosophy 46(3): 436–461.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2016a. Epistemology. Palgrave Philosophy Today. London: Palgrave Macmillan. First edition: Pritchard (2009a).
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2016b. “Epistemic Risk.” The Journal of Philosophy 113(11): 550–571.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2016c. “Ignorance and Epistemic Value.” in The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, edited by Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw, pp. 132–143. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9780511820076.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2016d. “Veritism and Epistemic Value.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 200–218. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2016e. “Seeing It for Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy.” Episteme 13(1): 29–42.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2017a. “Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value.” Synthese 194(5): 1477–1486.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2017b. “Wittgenstein on Skepticism.” in A Companion to Wittgenstein, edited by Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman, pp. 563–575. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118884607.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2017c. “Faith and Reason.” in Religious Epistemology, edited by Stephen Law, pp. 101–118. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2017d. “Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 57–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2018a. “Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education.” Metaphilosophy 49(3): 328–349.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2018b. “Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10(3): 51–66.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2018c. “Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Biscopic Treatment of Radical Scepticism.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 15–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2018d. “Unnatural Doubts.” in Skepticism. Historical and Contemporary Inquiries, edited by G. Anthony Bruno and A. C. Rutherford, pp. 223–247. London: Routledge.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2018e. “The Analysis of Knowledge.” in The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History, Volume 4: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington and Markos Valaris, pp. 215–230. London: Bloomsbury Academic, doi:10.5040/9781474258814.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2018f. “The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck.” in The Gettier Problem, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 96–107. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2019a. Scepticism. A Very Short Introduction. Very Short Introductions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2019b. “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.” in The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, edited by Heather Battaly, pp. 285–295. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315712550.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2019c. “Modal Accounts of Luck.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, edited by Ian M. Church and Robert J. Hartman, pp. 115–124. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2019d. “Skepticism.” in A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, edited by Graham Oppy, pp. 277–290. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119119302.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2019e. “Disagreement, Intellectual Humility and Reflection.” in Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho and Luca Tateo, pp. 59–72. Philosophical Studies Series n. 141. Cham: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2020a. “Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism.” in Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus, edited by Katja Maria Vogt and Justin Vlasits, pp. 173–191. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190946302.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2020b. “Epistemic Relativism and Epistemic Internalism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch, pp. 292–300. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351052306.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2021a. “Extended Cognition and Humility.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility, edited by Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch, and Alessandra Tanesini, pp. 464–471. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2021b. “Knowledge, Skill and Virtue Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise, edited by Ellen R. Fridland and Carlotta Pavese, pp. 135–145. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2021c. “Truth, Inquiry, Doubt.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45: Doubt, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Yuval Avnur, pp. 505–524. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp202110611.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2024. “Epistemological Disjunctivism and Evidence.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 40–50. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Kallestrup, Jesper. 2004. “An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 31(3–4): 345–354.
    Pritchard, Duncan, Millar, Alan and Haddock, Adrian. 2010. The Nature and Value of Knowledge. Three Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Ranalli, Chris. 2016a. “On Metaepistemological Scepticism.” in Intellectual Assurance. Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, edited by Brett Coppenger and Michael Bergmann, pp. 205–223. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Ranalli, Chris. 2016b. “Putnam on BIVs and Radical Skepticism.” in The Brain in a Vat, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 75–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706965.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Ranalli, Chris. 2021. “Colour, Scepticism, and Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by Derek Henry Brown and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 42–51. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351048521.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Richmond, Alasdair M. 2012. “Hume on Miracles.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Hume, edited by Alan Bailey and Dan O’Brien, pp. 227–244. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Ryan, Shane. 2014. “Zagzebski on Rationality [on Zagzebski (2012)].” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6(4): 39–46.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Turri, John. 2011. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Turri, John. 2014. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Pritchard, Duncan, Turri, John and Carter, J. Adam. 2018. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Pritchard, Duncan, Turri, John and Carter, J. Adam. 2022. “The Value of Knowledge.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/knowledge-value/.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Whittington, Lee John, eds. 2015a. The Philosophy of Luck. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119030614.
    Pritchard, Duncan and Whittington, Lee John. 2015b. “Introductory Note.” in The Philosophy of Luck, edited by Duncan Pritchard and Lee John Whittington, pp. 1–2. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119030614.

Further References

    Alston, William P. 2005. Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, doi:10.7591/9781501720574.
    Cassam, Quassim. 2007. The Possibility of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001.
    Coliva, Annalisa. 2010. Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. History of Analytic Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Fairweather, Abrol, ed. 2014. Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library n. 366. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Greco, John, ed. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
    Kelp, Christoph. 2009. “Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17(4): 584–587.
    Littlejohn, Clayton. 2015. “Knowledge and Awareness [on Pritchard (2012a)].” Analysis 75(4): 596–603.
    Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. 2015. “[Comments on Pritchard (2012a)].” Analysis 75(4): 604–615.
    Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001.
    Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. 2012. Epistemic Authority. A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2015. “Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem [on Pritchard (2012a)].” Analysis 75(4): 615–627.