Ophelia Deroy (deroy)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Auvray, Malika and Deroy, Ophelia. 2015. “How Do Synaesthetes Experience the World?” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 640–658. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
Cheng, Tony, Deroy, Ophelia and Spence, Charles, eds. 2018. Spatial Senses. Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science. London: Routledge.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2007. “The Power of Tastes: Reconciling Science and Subjectivity.” in Questions of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine, edited by Barry C. Smith, pp. 99–126. Oxford: Signal Books.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2010. “The Importance of Being Able: Personal Abilities in Common Sense Psychology and Cognitive Sciences.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10(1): 43–61.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2013. “Object-Sensitivity versus Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.” Philosophical Studies 162(1): 87–107.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2014a. “Review of O’Regan (2011).” Dialectica 68(3): 473–476.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2014b. “The Unity Assumption and the Many Unities of Consciousness.” in Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, edited by David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 105–124. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2014c. “Synesthesia: An Experience of the Third Kind? [on Brogaard (2014)].” in Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, edited by Richard O. Brown, pp. 395–408. Studies in Brain and Mind n. 6. Berlin: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2015a. “Can Sounds be Red? A New Account of Synaesthesia as Enriched Experience.” in Phenomenal Qualities. Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, edited by Paul Coates and Sam Coleman, pp. 376–399. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.001.0001.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2015b. “Modularity of Perception.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 755–779. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2015c. “Multisensory Perception and Cognitive Penetration: The Unity Assumption, Thirty Years Later.” in The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by John Zeimbekis and Athanassios Raftopoulos, pp. 144–159. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.001.0001.
Deroy, Ophelia, ed. 2017a. Sensory Blending. On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688289.001.0001.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2017b. “Introduction.” in Sensory Blending. On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena, edited by Ophelia Deroy, pp. 1–12. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688289.001.0001.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2019. “Predictions Do Not Entail Cognitive Penetration: ‘Racial’ Biases in Predictive Models of Perception.” in The Philosophy of Perception. Proceedings of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau and Friedrich Stadler, pp. 235–249. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 26. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110657920.
Deroy, Ophelia and Auvray, Malika. 2014. “A Crossmodal Perspective on Sensory Substitution.” in Perception and its Modalities, edited by Dustin R. Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, pp. 327–349. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199832798.001.0001.
Deroy, Ophelia and Spence, Charles. 2017. “Questioning the Continuity Claim: What Difference Does Consciousness Make?” in Sensory Blending. On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena, edited by Ophelia Deroy, pp. 191–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688289.001.0001.
Spence, Charles and Deroy, Ophelia. 2013. “How Automatic are Crossmodal Correspondences?” Consciousness and Cognition 22: 245–260.

Further References

Brogaard, Berit. 2014. “Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.” Analytic Philosophy 55(4): 382–393.
O’Regan, J. Kevin. 2011. Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell. Understanding the Feel of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.