Berit Brogaard (brogaard)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Brogaard, Berit. 2000. “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism.” The Monist 83(3): 341–356.
Brogaard, Berit. 2001. “Elusive Reference.” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Rationality and Irrationality, edited by Berit Brogaard and Barry Smith, pp. 36–45. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 29. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Brogaard, Berit. 2004a. “Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84(4): 351–370.
Brogaard, Berit. 2004b. “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem.” Synthese 139(3): 367–386.
Brogaard, Berit. 2004c. “Species as Individuals.” Biology and Philosophy 19(2): 223–242.
Brogaard, Berit. 2006a. “The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ Argument, and the Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts.” Synthese 152(1): 47–79.
Brogaard, Berit. 2006b. “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36(3): 335–354.
Brogaard, Berit. 2006c. “Two Modal-Isms: Fictionalism and Ersatzism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 20: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 77–94. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Brogaard, Berit. 2006d. “Tensed Relations.” Analysis 66(3): 194–202.
Brogaard, Berit. 2007a. “Number Words and Ontological Commitment.” The Philosophical Quarterly 57(226): 1–20, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.465.x.
Brogaard, Berit. 2007b. “Span Operators.” Analysis 67(1): 72–79.
Brogaard, Berit. 2007c. “Descriptions: Predicates or Quantifiers?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(1): 117–136.
Brogaard, Berit. 2007d. “Sharvy’s Theory of Definite Descriptions Revisited.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 160–180.
Brogaard, Berit. 2007e. “That May Be Jupiter: A Heuristic for Thinking Two-Dimensionally.” American Philosophical Quarterly 44(4): 315–328.
Brogaard, Berit. 2007f. “A Puzzle about Properties.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(3): 635–650.
Brogaard, Berit. 2008a. “Inscrutability and Ontological Commitment.” Philosophical Studies 141(1): 21–42.
Brogaard, Berit. 2008b. “Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?” Philosophy Compass 3(1): 93–118.
Brogaard, Berit. 2008c. “Sea Battle Semantics.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(231): 326–335.
Brogaard, Berit. 2008d. “Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(232): 385–409.
Brogaard, Berit. 2008e. “In Defence of a Perspectival Semantics for ‘Know’ .” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(3): 439–459.
Brogaard, Berit. 2008f. “Knowledge-The and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 77: 147–190.  “Knowledge and Questions,” ed. by Franck Lihoreau.
Brogaard, Berit. 2009a. “On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: A Case Study on Fitch’s Paradox.” in, pp. 241–251.
Brogaard, Berit. 2009b. “Introduction.” Synthese 166(2): 215–229.
Brogaard, Berit. 2009c. “Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009).” Philosophical Books 50(4): 213–226.
Brogaard, Berit. 2009d. “The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth.” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 284–307. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2009e. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 439–467.
Brogaard, Berit. 2010a. “Perspectival Truth and Color Primitivism.” in New Waves in Truth, edited by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Cory D. Wright, pp. 249–266. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Brogaard, Berit. 2010b. “Strong Representationalism and Centered Content.” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 373–392.
Brogaard, Berit. 2011a. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism.” in Philosophical Issues 21: The Epistemology of Perception, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 45–73. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brogaard, Berit. 2011b. “Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 137–158. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
Brogaard, Berit. 2011c. “Are there Unconscious Perceptual Processes?” Consciousness and Cognition 20: 449–463.
Brogaard, Berit. 2011d. “Knowledge-How: A Unified Account.” in Knowing How. Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, edited by John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, pp. 136–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2012a. Transient Truths. An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2012b. “Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves?” Philosophical Studies 159(3): 467–474.
Brogaard, Berit. 2012c. “What do we Say When we Say How or What we Feel?” Philosophers’ Imprint 12(11).
Brogaard, Berit. 2012d. “Non-Visual Consciousness and Visual Images in Blindsight.” Consciousness and Cognition 21: 595–596.
Brogaard, Berit. 2012e. “Vision for Action and the Contents of Perception.” The Journal of Philosophy 109(10): 569–587.
Brogaard, Berit. 2013a. “Do we Perceive Natural Kind Properties?” Philosophical Studies 162(1): 35–42.
Brogaard, Berit. 2013b. “Presentism, Primitivism and Cross-Temporal Relations: Lessons from Holistic Ersatzism and Dynamic Semantics.” in New Papers on the Present. Focus on Presentism, edited by Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller, and Giuliano Torrengo, pp. 253–279. Basic Philosophical Concepts. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzh22.
Brogaard, Berit. 2013c. “Précis [of Brogaard (2012a)].” Disputatio 5(37): 311–314.
Brogaard, Berit. 2013d. “Replies to Torrengo (2013), Zeman (2013) and Tsompanidis (2013).” Disputatio 5(37): 339–352.
Brogaard, Berit. 2013e. “It’s Not What it Seems. A Semantic Account of ‘Seems’ and Seemings.” Inquiry 56(2–3): 210–239.
Brogaard, Berit. 2013f. “An Empirically-Informed Cognitive Theory of Propositions.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43(5–6): 534–557.
Brogaard, Berit. 2013g. “Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism.” in Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Christopher Tucker, pp. 270–291. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit, ed. 2014a. Does Perception Have Content? New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2014b. “Introduction: Does Perception Have Content?” in Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, pp. 1–38. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2014c. “A Partial Defense of Extended Knowledge.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 39–62. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brogaard, Berit. 2014d. “Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 11–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2014e. “Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.” Analytic Philosophy 55(4): 382–393.
Brogaard, Berit. 2014f. “Varieties of Synesthetic Experience [reply to Deroy (2014)].” in Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, edited by Richard O. Brown, pp. 409–413. Studies in Brain and Mind n. 6. Berlin: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1.
Brogaard, Berit. 2014g. “Seeing as a Non-Experiential Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery.” in Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, edited by Richard O. Brown, pp. 377–394. Studies in Brain and Mind n. 6. Berlin: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1.
Brogaard, Berit. 2014h. “Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology.” in Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Abrol Fairweather, pp. 83–102. Synthese Library n. 366. Dordrecht: Springer.
Brogaard, Berit. 2014i. “Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief.” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 130–145. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2015a. On Romantic Love: Simple Truths about a Complex Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Brogaard, Berit. 2015b. “Perceptual Reports.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 237–255. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2015c. “Type 2 Blindsight and the Nature of Visual Experience.” Consciousness and Cognition 32: 92–103.
Brogaard, Berit. 2015d. “Reply to Critics: Dever (2015) and Hawthorne (2015).” Inquiry 58(6): 625–632.
Brogaard, Berit. 2016a. “Parental Love and the Meaning of Life.” in The Theory and Practice of Ontology, edited by Leo Zaibert, pp. 223–240. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Brogaard, Berit. 2016b. “Perceptual Appearances of Personality.” Philosophical Topics 44(2): 83–103.
Brogaard, Berit. 2016c. “Staying Indoors: How Phenomenal Dogmatism Solves the Skeptical Problem without Going Externalist.” in Intellectual Assurance. Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, edited by Brett Coppenger and Michael Bergmann, pp. 85–104. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2016d. “Perception and Its Objects.” Analysis 76(3): 374–380.
Brogaard, Berit. 2016e. “Against Naturalism about Truth.” in The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, edited by Kelly James Clark, pp. 262–276. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118657775.
Brogaard, Berit. 2016f. “Ignorance and Incompetence: Linguistic Considerations.” in The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, edited by Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw, pp. 57–80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9780511820076.
Brogaard, Berit. 2017a. “Moral Contextualism and Epistemic Contextualism: Similarities and Differences.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 361–374. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Brogaard, Berit. 2017b. “In Search of Mentons: Panpsychism, Physicalism and the Missing Link.” in Panpsychism. Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, pp. 130–152. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2017c. “Time and Tense.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller, 2nd ed., pp. 765–786. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.
Brogaard, Berit. 2017d. “Foundationalism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, edited by Sven Bernecker and Kourken Michaelian, pp. 296–309. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Brogaard, Berit. 2017e. “Synesthetic Binding and the Reactivation Model of Memory.” in Sensory Blending. On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena, edited by Ophelia Deroy, pp. 126–150. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688289.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2017f. “Virtue Epistemology in the Zombie Apocalypse: Hungry Judges, Heavy Clipboards, and Group Polarization.” in Epistemic Situationism, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Mark Alfano, pp. 62–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688234.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2017g. “A Semantic Framework for Aesthetic Expressions.” in Semantics of Aesthetic Judgements, edited by James O. Young, pp. 121–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714590.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2017h. “Seeing Things.” in Philosophical Perspectives 31: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 55–72. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12101.
Brogaard, Berit. 2018a. Seeing and Saying. The Language of Perception and the Representational View of Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190495251.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2018b. “Knowledge-How and Perceptual Learning.” in The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History, Volume 4: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington and Markos Valaris, pp. 139–154. London: Bloomsbury Academic, doi:10.5040/9781474258814.
Brogaard, Berit. 2019a. “Bias-Driven Attention, Cognitive Penetration and Epistemic Downgrading.” in The Philosophy of Perception.  Proceedings of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau and Friedrich Stadler, pp. 199–216. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 26. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110657920.
Brogaard, Berit. 2019b. “Dual-Process Theory and Intellectual Virtue: A Role for Self-Confidence.” in The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, edited by Heather Battaly, pp. 446–461. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315712550.
Brogaard, Berit. 2019c. “Love in Contemporary Psychology and Neuroscience.” in The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy, edited by Adrienne M. Martin, pp. 465–478. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315645209.
Brogaard, Berit. 2019d. “Supernatural.” in A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, edited by Graham Oppy, pp. 250–261. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119119302.
Brogaard, Berit. 2020. Hatred: Understanding Our Most Dangerous Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190084448.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit. 2021. “Colour Synaesthesia and Its Philosophical Implications.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by Derek Henry Brown and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 210–225. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351048521.
Brogaard, Berit and Chomanski, Bartek. 2015. “Cognitive Penetrability and High-Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96(4): 469–486, doi:10.1111/papq.12111.
Brogaard, Berit and Chudnoff, Elijah. 2016. “Against Emotional Dogmatism.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 59–77. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brogaard, Berit and Chudnoff, Elijah. 2018. “Multisensory Consciousness and Synesthesia.” in The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 322–336. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Brogaard, Berit and Chudnoff, Elijah. 2020. “Consciousness and Knowledge.” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 586–609. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brogaard, Berit and Gatzia, Dimitria Electra. 2018. “The Real Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.” Inquiry 61(5–6): 543–558, doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1368172.
Brogaard, Berit and Marlow, Kristian. 2013. “Is the Relativity of Simultaneity a Temporal Illusion?” Analysis 73(4): 635–642.
Brogaard, Berit, Marlow, Kristian and Rice, Kevin. 2014. “The Long-Term Potentiation Model for Grapheme-Color Binding in Synesthesia.” in Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, edited by David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 37–72. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2002. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2004. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2005. “Anti-realism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy.” Noûs 39(1): 123–139.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2006. “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle.” American Philosophical Quarterly 43(3): 261–270.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2007a. “Why Counterpossibles are Non-Trivial.” The Reasoner 1(1): 5–6.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2007b. “A Counterfactual Account of Essence.” The Reasoner 1(4): 4–5.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2008a. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2008b. “Counteractuals and Contexts.” Analysis 68(1): 39–46.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2013a. “Remarks on Counterpossibles.” Synthese 190(4): 639–660.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2013b. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joseph [Joe]. 2019. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/fitch-paradox/.
Brogaard, Berit and Smith, Barry, eds. 2001. Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Rationality and Irrationality. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 29. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Gatzia, Dimitria Electra and Brogaard, Berit, eds. 2020. The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190648916.001.0001.
Kentridge, Robert W. and Brogaard, Berit. 2017. “The Functional Roles of Attention.” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, edited by Bence Nanay, pp. 139–147. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Pismenny, Arina and Brogaard, Berit, eds. 2022a. The Moral Psychology of Love. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, doi:10.5771/9781538151013.
Pismenny, Arina and Brogaard, Berit. 2022b. “Vices of Friendship.” in The Moral Psychology of Love, edited by Arina Pismenny and Berit Brogaard, pp. 231–254. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, doi:10.5771/9781538151013.
Smith, Barry and Brogaard, Berit. 2000. “A Unified Theory of Truth and Reference.” Logique et Analyse 43(169–170): 49–93.
Smith, Barry and Brogaard, Berit. 2002. “Quantum Mereotopology.” Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 35(1–2): 153–175.
Smith, Barry and Brogaard, Berit. 2006. “Sechzehn Tage – Wann beginnt ein menschliches Leben?” in Untersuchungen zur Ontologie, edited by Guido Imaguire and Christina Schneider, pp. 3–40. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzhwg.
Sosa, Ernest, Villanueva, Enrique and Brogaard, Berit, eds. 2012. Philosophical Issues 22: Action Theory. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.

Further References

Cappelen, Herman and Hawthorne, John. 2009. Relativism and Monadic Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560554.001.0001.
Deroy, Ophelia. 2014. “The Unity Assumption and the Many Unities of Consciousness.” in Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, edited by David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 105–124. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001.
Dever, Josh. 2015. “Eternalism, Temporalism, Neutralism [on Brogaard (2012a)].” Inquiry 58(6): 608–618.
Hawthorne, John. 2015. “Comments on Brogaard (2012a).” Inquiry 58(6): 619–626.
Torrengo, Giuliano. 2013. “Propositions and the Metaphysics of Time.” Disputatio 5(37): 315–321.
Tsompanidis, Vasilis. 2013. “On Two Arguments for Temporally Neutral Propositions.” Disputatio 5(37): 329–337.
Zeman, Dan. 2013. “Temporalism and Composite Tense Operators.” Disputatio 5(37): 323–328.