Josh Dever (dever)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Asher, Nicholas, Dever, Josh and Pappas, Chris. 2009. “Supervaluations Debugged.” Mind 118(472): 901–933.
Bonevac, Daniel and Dever, Josh. 2012. “A History of the Connectives.” in Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 11: Logic: A History of its Central Concepts, edited by Dov M. Gabbay, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, and John Woods, pp. 175–234. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Bonevac, Daniel, Dever, Josh and Sosa, David. 2006. “The Conditional Fallacy.” The Philosophical Review 115(3): 273–316.
Bonevac, Daniel, Dever, Josh and Sosa, David. 2011. “The Counterexample Fallacy.” Mind 120(480): 1143–1158.
Cappelen, Herman and Dever, Josh. 2001. “Believing in Words.” Synthese 127: 279–301.
Cappelen, Herman and Dever, Josh. 2013. The Inessential Indexical. On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686742.001.0001.
Cappelen, Herman and Dever, Josh. 2016. Context and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, Herman and Dever, Josh. 2018. Puzzles of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, Herman and Dever, Josh. 2021a. Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894724.001.0001.
Cappelen, Herman and Dever, Josh. 2021b. “n the Uselessness of the Distinction Between Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory (At Least in the Philosophy of Language).” in The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo and Rachel Katharine Sterken, pp. 91–106. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781003164869.
Cappelen, Herman and Dever, Josh. 2021c. “Acting without Me: Corporate Agency and the First Person Perspective.” in The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, edited by Stephen Biggs and Heimir Geirsson, pp. 499–514. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Dever, Josh. 1999. “Compositionality as Methodology.” Linguistics and Philosophy 22(3): 311–326.
Dever, Josh. 2001. “Complex Demonstratives.” Linguistics and Philosophy 24(3): 271–330.
Dever, Josh. 2003a. “Review of Szabó (2000).” The Philosophical Review 112(2): 254–258.
Dever, Josh. 2003b. “Modal Fictionalism and Compositionality.” Philosophical Studies 114(3): 223–251.
Dever, Josh. 2006. “Compositionality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 633–666. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
Dever, Josh. 2007. “Low-Grade Two-Dimensionalism [on Soames (2005)].” Philosophical Books 48(1): 1–16.
Dever, Josh. 2009. “The Disunity of Truth.” in Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values. Essays in Honour of Ernie Lepore, edited by Christopher Viger and Robert J. Stainton, pp. 147–192. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy n. 85. Dordrecht: Springer.
Dever, Josh. 2011. “Epistemic Modals.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 545–557. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Dever, Josh. 2012a. “Compositionality.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 91–102. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Dever, Josh. 2012b. “Formal Semantics.” in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 47–83. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Second edition: Garcı́a-Carpintero and Kölbel (2014).
Dever, Josh. 2013. “The Revenge of the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction.” in Philosophical Perspectives 27: Philosophy of Language, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 104–144. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Dever, Josh. 2015. “Eternalism, Temporalism, Neutralism [on Brogaard (2012)].” Inquiry 58(6): 608–618.
Dever, Josh. 2016. “What is Philosophical Methodology?” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 3–26. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Dever, Josh. 2018. “Antiobjects.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 89–106. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12117.
Dever, Josh. 2020. “Preliminary Scouting Reports from the Outer Limits of Conceptual Engineering.” in Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, pp. 152–169. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001.

Further References

Brogaard, Berit. 2012. Transient Truths. An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.001.0001.
Soames, Scott. 2005. Reference and Description: The Case against Two-Dimensionalism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Szabó, Zoltán Gendler. 2000. Problems of Compositionality. New York: Garland Publishing Co., doi:10.4324/9781315054438.