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Imogen Dickie (dickie-i)

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Bibliography

    Dickie, Imogen. 2008. Informative Identities in the Begriffsschrift and ’On Sense and Reference’ .” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38(2): 269–288.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2010a. The Generality of Particular Thought.” The Philosophical Quarterly 60(240): 508–531.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2010b. Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence.” Philosophical Studies 150(2): 161–185.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2010c. We are Acquainted with Ordinary Things.” in New Essays on Singular Thought, edited by Robin Jeshion, pp. 213–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.001.0001.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2011a. How Proper Names Refer.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111(1): 43–78.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2011b. Visual Attention Fixes Demonstrative Reference by Eliminating Referential Luck.” in Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, edited by Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies, and Wayne Wu, pp. 292–322. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2014a. A Practical Solution to the Problem of Empty Singular Thought.” in Empty Representations. Reference & Non-Existence, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Genoveva Martı́, pp. 215–243. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647057.001.0001.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2014b. The Sortal Dependence of Demonstrative Reference.” European Journal of Philosophy 22(1): 34–60.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2015a. Fixing Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755616.001.0001.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2015b. Perception and Demonstratives.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 833–852. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
    Dickie, Imogen. 2016. The Essential Connection between Epistemology and the Theory of Reference.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 99–129. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Dickie, Imogen and Rattan, Gurpreet. 2010. Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement.” Dialectica 64(2): 131–151.