Dylan Dodd (dodd-d)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Dodd, Dylan. 2009. “Weakness of Will as Intention-Violation.” European Journal of Philosophy 17(1): 45–59.
Dodd, Dylan. 2011a. “Against Fallibilism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(4): 665–685.
Dodd, Dylan. 2011b. “Quasi-Miracles, Typicality, and Counterfactuals.” Synthese 179(3): 251–360.
Dodd, Dylan. 2012a. “Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries.” Erkenntnis 77(1): 95–120.
Dodd, Dylan. 2012b. “Counterfactuals and Chance: Reply to Williams (2012).” Analytic Philosophy 53(4): 362–365.
Dodd, Dylan. 2012c. “Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments.” Synthese 189(2): 337–352.
Dodd, Dylan. 2014. “How to Motivate Scepticism.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 337–356. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
Dodd, Dylan. 2017. “Belief and Certainty.” Synthese 194(11): 4597–4621.
Dodd, Dylan and Sweeney, Paula. 2010. “Indexicals and Utterance Production.” Philosophical Studies 150(3): 331–348.
Dodd, Dylan and Zardini, Elia, eds. 2014a. Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
Dodd, Dylan and Zardini, Elia. 2014b. “Introduction: Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 1–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.

Further References

Williams, J. Robert G. 2012. “Chancy Counterfactuals, Redux.” Analytic Philosophy 53(4): 352–361.