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Berent Enç (enc-b)

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The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory

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Bibliography

    Adams, Frederick and Enç, Berent. 1988. Not Quite By Accident.” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 27(2): 287–297.
    Dretske, Fred I. and Enç, Berent. 1984. Causal Theories of Knowledge.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: Causation and Causal Theories, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 517–528. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
    Enç, Berent. 1982. Intentional States of Mechanical Devices.” Mind 91(362): 161–182, doi:10.1093/mind/xci.362.161.
    Enç, Berent. 1983. In Defense of the Identity Theory.” The Journal of Philosophy 80: 279–298.
    Enç, Berent. 1985. Hume on Causal Necessity: A Study from the Perspective of Hume’s Theory of Passions.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2(3): 235–256.
    Enç, Berent. 1986. Essentialism without Individual Essences: Causation, Kinds, Supervenience, and Restricted Identities.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 403–426. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
    Enç, Berent. 1990. Is Realism Really the Best Hypothesis? The Journal of Philosophy 87: 667–668.
    Enç, Berent. 1995. Nonreducible Supervenient Causation.” in Supervenience: New Essays, edited by Elias E. Savellos and Ümit D. Yalçin, pp. 169–186. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Enç, Berent. 1996. Hume’s Unreasonable Desires.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 13(2): 239–254.
    Enç, Berent. 2002. Indeterminacy of Function Attributions.” in Functions. New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, edited by André Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman, pp. 291–313. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Enç, Berent. 2003. How We Act. Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199256020.001.0001.
    Enç, Berent. 2005. How Causes can Rationalize: Belief-Desire Explanations of Action.” in Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, edited by Gürol Irzık and Güven Güzeldere, pp. 231–250. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 244. Dordrecht: Springer.