William Fish (fish-w)
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Bibliography
Corazza, Eros, Fish, William and Gorvett, Jonathan. 2002. “Who is ‘I’?” Philosophical Studies 107(1): 1–21, doi:10.1023/A:1013111419036.
Fish, William. 2005a. “Disjunctivism and Non-Disjunctivism: Making Sense of the Debate.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 119–127.
Fish, William. 2005b. “Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality.” in Intentionality. Past and Future, edited by Gábor Forrai and George Kampis, pp. 25–36. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Fish, William. 2008. “Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination.” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 144–167. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001.
Fish, William. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001.
Fish, William. 2010. Philosophy of Perception. A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Fish, William. 2013a. “High-Level Properties and Visual Experience.” Philosophical Studies 162(1): 43–55.
Fish, William. 2013b. “Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics [Pautz (2013) and Martin (2013)].” Philosophical Studies 163(1): 57–66.
Fish, William. 2016. “Review of Willaschek (2013).” Dialectica 70(4): 632–635.
Fish, William and Macdonald, Cynthia. 2007. “On McDowell’s Identity Conception of Truth.” Analysis 67(1): 36–41.
Further References
Dodd, Julian. 2008. “McDowell’s Identity Conception of Truth: A Reply to Fish and Macdonald (2007).” Analysis 68(1): 76–85.
Martin, M. G. F. 2013. “Shibboleth: Some Comments on Fish (2009).” Philosophical Studies 163(1): 37–48.
Pautz, Adam. 2013. “Do the Benefits of Naı̈ve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish (2009).” Philosophical Studies 163(1): 25–36.
Willaschek, Marcus, ed. 2013. Disjunctivism. Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. London: Routledge.