Guy Fletcher (fletcher-g)
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Bibliography
Fletcher, Guy. 1995a. The Scientific Credibility of Folk Psychology. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Fletcher, Guy. 1995b. “Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science.” Philosophical Psychology 8: 375–388.
Fletcher, Guy. 2009. “On Hatzimoysis on Sentimental Value.” Philosophia 37(1): 149–152.
Fletcher, Guy. 2010. “Brown and Moore’s Value Invariabilism vs. Dancy’s Variabilism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 60(238): 162–168.
Fletcher, Guy. 2012. “Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value.” Philosophical Studies 157(1): 77–91.
Fletcher, Guy. 2014a. “Hybrid Views in Meta-ethics: Pragmatic Views.” Philosophy Compass 9(12): 848–863.
Fletcher, Guy. 2014b. “Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature.” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 173–198. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
Fletcher, Guy, ed. 2016a. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Fletcher, Guy. 2016b. “Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XI, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 45–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.001.0001.
Fletcher, Guy. 2016c. “Mill’s Art of Life.” in A Companion to Mill, edited by Christopher Macleod and Dale E. Miller, pp. 295–312. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118736739.
Fletcher, Guy. 2016d. “Objective List Theories.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, edited by Guy Fletcher, pp. 148–160. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Fletcher, Guy. 2017. “Indeterminism, Gravitation, and Spacetime Theory.” in Making It Formally Explicit: Probability, Causality and Indeterminism, edited by Gábor Hofer-Szabó and Leszek Wroński, pp. 179–192. European Studies in Philosophy of Science n. 6. Dordrecht: Springer.
Fletcher, Guy. 2018a. “Needing and Necessity.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VIII, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 170–192. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198828310.001.0001.
Fletcher, Guy. 2018b. “Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(3): 474–482.
Fletcher, Guy. 2019. “Taking Prudence Seriously.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XIV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 70–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198841449.001.0001.
Fletcher, Guy. 2021. Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198858263.001.0001.
Fletcher, Guy. 2022. “A Painful End for Perfectionism?” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46: Well-Being and Ill-Being, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, Yuval Avnur, and Gwendolyn Bradford, pp. 233–250. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp2022112328.
Fletcher, Guy and Ridge, Michael, eds. 2014. Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.