Michael Ridge (ridge)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Archer, Alfred and Ridge, Michael. 2015. “The Heroism Paradox: Another Paradox of Supererogation.” Philosophical Studies 172(6): 1575–1592.
Barandalla, Ana and Ridge, Michael. 2011. “Critical Notice of Korsgaard (2008, 2009).” Analysis 71(2): 364–380.
Fletcher, Guy and Ridge, Michael, eds. 2014. Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael. 2005. “What does Holism Have to Do with Moral Particularism?” Ratio 18(1).
McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael. 2006. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199290652.001.0001.
McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael. 2011. “Aesthetics and Particularism.” in New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael Sean Brady, pp. 264–285. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9780230294899.
McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael. 2012. “Elusive Reasons.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 110–137. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.001.0001.
McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael. 2013. “Why Holists should Love Organic Unities.” in Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, edited by David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little, pp. 265–285. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.001.0001.
Ridge, Michael. 1998. “Humean Intentions.” American Philosophical Quarterly 35: 157–178.
Ridge, Michael. 2000. “Modesty as a Virtue.” American Philosophical Quarterly 37(3): 269–283.
Ridge, Michael. 2001. “Taking Solipsism Seriously: Nonhuman Animals and Meta-Cognitive Theories of Consciousness.” Philosophical Studies 103(3): 315–340.
Ridge, Michael. 2003a. “Epistemology Moralized: David Hume’s Practical Epistemology.” Hume Studies 29(2): 165–204.
Ridge, Michael. 2003b. “Moral Non-Naturalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/moral-non-naturalism/.
Ridge, Michael. 2005a. “Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative Reasons.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/reasons-agent/.
Ridge, Michael. 2005b. “Why Must We Treat Humanity with Respect? Evaluating the Regress Argument.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1(1): 57–73.
Ridge, Michael. 2005c. “Universalizability for Collective Rational Agents: A Critique of Agent-Relativism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(1): 34–66.
Ridge, Michael. 2006a. “Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege.” Ethics 116(2): 302–336.
Ridge, Michael. 2006b. “Sincerity and Expressivism.” Philosophical Studies 131(2): 487–510.
Ridge, Michael. 2007a. “Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume II, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 51–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ridge, Michael. 2007b. “Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 81: 83–108.
Ridge, Michael. 2008a. “Preempting Principles: Recent Debates in Moral Particularism.” Philosophy Compass 3(6): 1177–1192.
Ridge, Michael. 2008b. “Moral Non-Naturalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-non-naturalism/.
Ridge, Michael. 2009a. “Moral Assertion for Expressivists.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 182–204. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ridge, Michael. 2009b. “The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism.” in Reasons for Action, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall, pp. 219–242. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ridge, Michael. 2009c. “Consequentialist Kantianism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 23: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 421–438. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Ridge, Michael. 2010. “David Hume, Paternalist.” Hume Studies 36(2): 149–170.
Ridge, Michael. 2011. “Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/reasons-agent/.
Ridge, Michael. 2012. “Supervenience and the Nature of Normativity.” in Ethical Naturalism. Current Debates, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 144–168. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ridge, Michael. 2013. “Getting Lost on the Road to Larissa.” Noûs 47(1): 181–201.
Ridge, Michael. 2014a. Impassioned Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.001.0001.
Ridge, Michael. 2014b. “Moral Non-Naturalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/moral-non-naturalism/.
Ridge, Michael. 2014c. “How to Insult a Philosopher.” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 3–21. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
Ridge, Michael. 2015. “Internalism: Cui Bono?” in Motivational Internalism, edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Sixten Strandberg, Ragnar Francén, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Bjorklund, pp. 135–149. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published under the name “Ragnar Francén Olinder”, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.001.0001.
Ridge, Michael. 2017. “Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/reasons-agent/.
Ridge, Michael. 2018a. “Expressivism and Collectives.” Mind 127(506): 833–861.
Ridge, Michael. 2018b. “How to Be an Epistemic Expressivist.” in Metaepistemology, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 141–158. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
Ridge, Michael. 2019a. “Play and Games: An Opinionated Introduction.” Philosophy Compass 14(4), doi:10.1111/phc3.12573.
Ridge, Michael. 2019b. “Moral Non-Naturalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/moral-non-naturalism/.
Ridge, Michael. 2022. “Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/reasons-agent/.
Ridge, Michael and McKeever, Sean. 2006. “Particularism and the Contingent A Priori.” Acta Analytica 21(2): 3–11.
Ridge, Michael and McKeever, Sean. 2010. “Moral Particularism.” in The Routledge Companion to Ethics, edited by John Skorupski, pp. 628–640. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Ridge, Michael and McKeever, Sean. 2016. “Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-particularism-generalism/.
Ridge, Michael and McKeever, Sean. 2023. “Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/moral-particularism-generalism/.

Further References

Korsgaard, Christine M. 2008. The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.001.0001.
Korsgaard, Christine M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552795.001.0001.