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Kenneth M. Ford (ford-km)

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Bibliography

    Feltovich, Paul J., Ford, Kenneth M. and Hoffman, Robert R., eds. 1997. Expertise in Context: Human and Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Ford, Kenneth M., Allen, James F., Suri, Niranjan, Hayes, Patrick J. and Morris, Robert. 2010. PIM: A Novel Architecture for Coordinating Behavior of Distributed Systems.” The AI Magazine 31(2): 9–24.
    Ford, Kenneth M., Glymour, Clark N. and Hayes, Patrick J., eds. 1995. Android Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Second edition: Ford, Glymour and Hayes (2006).
    Ford, Kenneth M., Glymour, Clark N. and Hayes, Patrick J., eds. 2006. Thinking about Android Epistemology. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First edition: Ford, Glymour and Hayes (1995).
    Ford, Kenneth M. and Hayes, Patrick J., eds. 1991. Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.
    Ford, Kenneth M. and Pylyshyn, Zenon W., eds. 1996. The Robot’s Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co.
    Hayes, Patrick J. and Ford, Kenneth M. 1995. Turing Test Considered Harmful.” in IJCAI-95. Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 1, edited by Christopher S. Mellish and C. Raymond Perrault, pp. 972–977. San Francisco, California: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
    Hayes, Patrick J., Ford, Kenneth M. and Adams-Webber, Jack R. 1992. Human Reasoning about Artificial Intelligence.” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 4: 247–263. Reprinted in Dietrich (1994, 331–353).
    Hayes, Patrick J., Ford, Kenneth M. and Agnew, Neil M. 1996. Epilog: Goldilocks and the Frame Problem.” in The Robot’s Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence, edited by Kenneth M. Ford and Zenon W. Pylyshyn, pp. 135–137. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co.
    LaForte, Geoffrey, Hayes, Patrick J. and Ford, Kenneth M. 1998. Why Gödel’s Theorem Cannot Refute Computationalism.” Artificial Intelligence 104(1–2): 265–286.

Further References

    Dietrich, Eric, ed. 1994. Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Essays on the Intentionality of Machines. New York: Academic Press.