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Bryan Frances (frances-b)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Cited in the following articles

What is the Point of Persistent Disputes?

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Bibliography

    Frances, Bryan. 2005. Scepticism Comes Alive. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199282137.001.0001.
    Frances, Bryan. 2006. The New Leibniz’s Law Arguments for Pluralism.” Mind 115(460): 1007–1021.
    Frances, Bryan. 2007. Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks.” Philosophical Studies 133(2): 199–232.
    Frances, Bryan. 2008a. Spirituality, Expertise, and Philosophers.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume I, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 44–81. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Frances, Bryan. 2008b. Live Skeptical Hypotheses.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 225–245. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
    Frances, Bryan. 2011. Disagreement.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 68–74. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Frances, Bryan. 2012. Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20(1): 1–21.
    Frances, Bryan. 2013. Philosophical Renegades.” in The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, pp. 121–166. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001.
    Frances, Bryan. 2014. Disagreement. Cambridge: Polity Press, https://archive.org/details/disagreement0000fran.
    Frances, Bryan. 2015. Religious Disagreement.” in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, edited by Graham Oppy, pp. 180–191. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Frances, Bryan. 2016a. Rationally Held \(P\), but I Fully Believe \(\neg P\) and I am Not Equivocating’ .” Philosophical Studies 173(2): 309–313.
    Frances, Bryan. 2016b. Ontology, Composition, Quantification and Action.” Analysis 76(2): 137–142.
    Frances, Bryan. 2016c. The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(2): 123–138.
    Frances, Bryan. 2016d. Presentism: Foreigner-Friendly or Xenophobic? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(3): 479–488.
    Frances, Bryan. 2016e. Worrisome Skepticism about Philosophy.” Episteme 13(3): 289–303.
    Frances, Bryan. 2017. Extensive Philosophical Agreement and Progress.” Metaphilosophy 48(1–2): 47–57.
    Frances, Bryan. 2019. Philosophical Expertise.” in The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, edited by David Coady and James Kennedy Chase, pp. 297–306. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Frances, Bryan and Hazlett, Allan. 2014. Knowledge.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson, pp. 432–452. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Frances, Bryan and Matheson, Jonathan D. 2018. Disagreement.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/.
    Frances, Bryan and Matheson, Jonathan D. 2024. Disagreement.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/disagreement/.