Jonathan D. Matheson (matheson-j)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Carey, Brandon and Matheson, Jonathan D. 2013. “How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View?” in Disagreement and Skepticism, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 131–149. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 46. London: Routledge.
Frances, Bryan and Matheson, Jonathan D. 2018. “Disagreement.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/.
Frances, Bryan and Matheson, Jonathan D. 2024. “Disagreement.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/disagreement/.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2009. “Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.” Episteme 6(3): 269–279.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2011. “The Case for Rational Uniqueness.” Logos & Episteme 2(3): 359–373.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2013. “Review of Evans and Smith (2012).” Metascience 22(2): 471–474.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2014a. “Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 3–20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2014b. “Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 315–330. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2014c. “Epistemic Relativism.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison, pp. 185–205. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2015a. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2015b. “Is there a Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem?” Philosophical Studies 172(2): 459–468.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2015c. “Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.” Oxford Philosophy Handbooks Online, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.13.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2018. “Gritty Faith.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92(3): 499–513.
Matheson, Jonathan D. 2024. “Disagreement and Higher-order Evidence.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 256–272. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Matheson, Jonathan D. and Vitz, Rico, eds. 2014. The Ethics of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
Rogers, Jason and Matheson, Jonathan D. 2011. “Bergmann’s Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists.” Philosophical Studies 152(1): 55–80.

Further References

Evans, Ian and Smith, Nicholas D. 2012. Knowledge. Cambridge: Polity Press.