Shaun Gallagher (gallagher-s)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Fiebich, Anika, Gallagher, Shaun and Hutto, Daniel D. 2017. “Pluralism, Interaction, and the Ontogeny of Social Cognition.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind, edited by Julian Kiverstein, pp. 208–221. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun. 1995. “Body Schema and Intentionality.” in The Body and the Self, edited by José-Luis Bermúdez, Anthony J. Marcel, and Naomi Eilan, pp. 225–244. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Gallagher, Shaun. 1996. “The Moral Significance of Primitive Self-Consciousness: A Response to Bermudez.” Ethics 107: 129–140.
Gallagher, Shaun. 1997. “Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 4: 195–214.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2000. “Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error through Misidentification.” in Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience, edited by Dan Zahavi, pp. 203–241. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2003. “Sync-Ing in the Stream of Experience: Time-Consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton.” Psyche 9(10).
Gallagher, Shaun. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199271941.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2006a. “Where’s the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will.” in Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition, edited by Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher, pp. 109–124. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2006b. “The Intrinsic Spatial Frame of Reference.” in A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, pp. 346–355. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996508.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2007a. “The Natural Philosophy of Agency.” Philosophy Compass 2(2): 347–357.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2007b. “Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness.” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, pp. 686–696. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2007c. “Pathologies in Narrative Structures.” in Narrative and Understanding Persons, edited by Daniel D. Hutto, pp. 203–224. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2008a. “Inference or Interaction: Social Cognition without Precursors.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 11(3): 163–174.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2008b. “Direct Perception in the Intersubjective Context.” Consciousness and Cognition 17: 535–543.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2008c. “Another Look at Intentions: A Response to Raphael Van Riel’s ‘On How We Perceive the Social World’ .” Consciousness and Cognition 17: 553–555.
Gallagher, Shaun, ed. 2011a. The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2011b. “Somaesthetics and the Care of the Body.” Metaphilosophy 42(3): 305–313.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2011c. “Embodiment and Phenomenal Qualities: An Enactive Interpretation.” Philosophical Topics 39(1): 1–14.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2011d. “Time in Action.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, edited by Craig Callender, pp. 420–438. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199298204.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2011e. “Introduction: A Diversity of Selves.” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, edited by Shaun Gallagher, pp. 1–32. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2012a. Phenomenology. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2012b. “The Body in Social Context: Some Qualifications on the ‘Warmth and Intimacy’ of Bodily Self-Consciousness.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 84: 91–121.  “Facets of Self-Consciousness,” ed. by Katja Crone, Kristina Musholt and Anna Strasser.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2012c. “Cognitive Science.” in The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, edited by Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard, pp. 574–585. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2012d. “First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.” in Consciousness and Subjectivity, edited by Sofia Miguens and Gerhard Preyer, pp. 245–272. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 47. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2012e. “Social Cognition, the Chinese Room, and the Robot Replies.” in Knowing without Thinking. Mind, Action, Cognition and the Phenomenon of the Background, edited by Zdravko Radman, pp. 83–97. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2013a. “Husserl and the Phenomenology of Temporality.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, pp. 135–150. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118522097.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2013b. “The Enactive Hand.” in The Hand, an Organ of the Mind. What the Manual Tells the Mental, edited by Zdravko Radman, pp. 209–226. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2013c. “On the Possibility of Naturalizing Phenomenology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi, pp. 70–93. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2013d. “Intersubjectivity and Psychopathology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, edited by K. W. M. [Bill] Fulford, Martin Kinsey Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton, pp. 258–274. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2013e. “Ambiguity in the Sense of Agency.” in Decomposing the Will, edited by Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, and Tillmann Vierkant, pp. 118–135. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746996.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2014a. “Pragmatic Interventions into Enactive and Extended Conceptions of Cognition.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 110–126. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2014b. “Phenomenology and Embodied Cognition.” in The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, edited by Lawrence A. Shapiro, pp. 9–18. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2015a. “Seeing Without an I.” in Mind, Language and Action. Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker A. Munz, and Annalisa Coliva, pp. 549–568. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 22. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2015b. “Seeing Things in the Right Way: How Social Interaction Shapes Perception.” in Normativity in Perception, edited by Maxime Doyon and Thiemo Breyer, pp. 117–127. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2015c. “Self and Narrative.” in The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics, edited by Jeff E. Malpas and Hans-Helmuth Gander, pp. 403–414. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2017a. Enactivist Interventions. Rethinking the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198794325.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2017b. “Empathy and Theories of Direct Perception.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, edited by Heidi L. Maibom, pp. 158–168. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2017c. “Deflationary Accounts of the Sense of Ownership.” in Sensory Blending. On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena, edited by Ophelia Deroy, pp. 145–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199688289.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2018. “Consciousness and Action.” in The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 298–309. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2020. Action and Interaction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846345.001.0001.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2021. “The Phenomenology of Agency and the Cognitive Sciences.” in The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency, edited by Christopher Erhard and Tobias Keiling, pp. 336–350. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2022. Phenomenology. Palgrave Philosophy Today. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-11586-8.
Gallagher, Shaun and Ilundáin-Agurruza, Jesús. 2021. “Self- and Other-Awareness in Joint Expert Performance.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise, edited by Ellen R. Fridland and Carlotta Pavese, pp. 378–393. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun and Meltzoff, Andrew N. 1996. “The Earliest Sense of Self and Others: Merleau-Ponty and Recent Developmental Studies.” Philosophical Psychology 9: 211–233.
Gallagher, Shaun and Overgaard, Morten. 2005. “Introspections without Introspeculations [on Price and Aydede (2005)].” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 277–290. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2005. “Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2006. “Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2008a. The Phenomenological Mind. London: Routledge.
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2008b. “Précis of Gallagher and Zahavi (2008a).” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 4–9.
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2010. “Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2012. The Phenomenological Mind. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. First edition: Gallagher and Zahavi (2008a).
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2014. “Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2019. “Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2021. The Phenomenological Mind. 3rd ed. London: Routledge. First edition: Gallagher and Zahavi (2008a).
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2023. “Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.
Mundale, Jennifer and Gallagher, Shaun. 2009. “Delusional Experience.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, edited by John Bickle, pp. 513–521. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.001.0001.
Pockett, Susan, Banks, William P. and Gallagher, Shaun, eds. 2006a. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Pockett, Susan, Banks, William P. and Gallagher, Shaun. 2006b. “Introduction.” in Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition, edited by Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher, pp. 1–7. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Vincent, Sarah and Gallagher, Shaun. 2016. “From False Beliefs to True Interactions: Are Chimpanzees Socially Enactive?” in, pp. 280–288.
Vogeley, Kai and Gallagher, Shaun. 2011. “Self in the Brain.” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, edited by Shaun Gallagher, pp. 111–138. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001.
Zahavi, Dan and Gallagher, Shaun. 2008a. “Reply [to Hutto (2008; Schwabe and Blanke 2008; Slors 2008; Tanesini 2008): A Phenomenology with Legs and Brains.” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 86–107.
Zahavi, Dan and Gallagher, Shaun. 2008b. “The (In)visibility of Others: A Reply to Herschbach (2008).” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 11(3): 237–244.

Further References

Herschbach, Mitchell. 2008. “Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 11(3): 223–235.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2008. “Articulating and Understanding the Phenomenological Manifesto [on Gallagher and Zahavi (2008b)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 10–19.
Price, Donald D. and Aydede, Murat. 2005. “The Experimental Use of Introspection in the Scientific Study of Pain and Its Integration with Third-Person Methodologies: The Experiential-Phenomenological Approach.” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 243–273. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Schwabe, Lars and Blanke, Olaf. 2008. “Phenomenology as a Toolbox for Cognitive Science [on Gallagher and Zahavi (2008b)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 71–85.
Slors, Marc. 2008. “The Importance and Limits of the Phenomenological Mind [on Gallagher and Zahavi (2008b)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 34–44.
Tanesini, Alessandra. 2008. “Intentionality and the Externalism versus Internalism Debate [on Gallagher and Zahavi (2008b)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 45–53.