Daniel D. Hutto (hutto)
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Bibliography
Fiebich, Anika, Gallagher, Shaun and Hutto, Daniel D. 2017. “Pluralism, Interaction, and the Ontogeny of Social Cognition.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind, edited by Julian Kiverstein, pp. 208–221. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Hutto, Daniel D. 1995. “Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett.” The Monist 78(4): 464–479.
Hutto, Daniel D. 1996. “Was the Later Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist?” in Current Issues in Idealism, edited by Paul Coates and Daniel D. Hutto. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Hutto, Daniel D. 1998a. “Davidson’s Identity Crisis.” Dialectica 52(1): 45–62.
Hutto, Daniel D. 1998b. “An Ideal Solution to the Problems of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 5: 328–343.
Hutto, Daniel D. 1998c. “Non-Conceptual Content and Objectivity.” The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2004. “More Making Sense of Nonsense: From Logical Form to Forms of Life.” in Post-Analytic Tractatus, edited by Barry Stocker, pp. 127–150. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
Hutto, Daniel D., ed. 2007a. Narrative and Understanding Persons. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2007b. “Narrative and Understanding Persons.” in Narrative and Understanding Persons, edited by Daniel D. Hutto, pp. 1–16. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2007c. “The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology.” in Narrative and Understanding Persons, edited by Daniel D. Hutto, pp. 43–68. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2008a. “Articulating and Understanding the Phenomenological Manifesto [on Gallagher and Zahavi (2008b)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 10–19.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2008b. “The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Clarifications and Implications.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 11(3): 175–192.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2009a. “Philosophical Clarification, Its Possibility and Point.” Philosophia 37(4): 629–652.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2009b. “ToM Rules, but It Is Not OK!” in Against Theory of Mind, edited by Ivan Leudar and Alan Costall, pp. 221–238. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2011a. “Presumptuous Naturalism: A Cautionary Tale.” American Philosophical Quarterly 48(2): 129–146.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2011b. “Consciousness.” in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by James Garvey, pp. 35–53. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2012. “Exposing the Background: Deep and Local.” in Knowing without Thinking. Mind, Action, Cognition and the Phenomenon of the Background, edited by Zdravko Radman, pp. 37–56. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2013a. “Enactivism, from a Wittgensteinian Point of View.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50(3): 281–302.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2013b. “Fictionalism about Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96(4): 582–604.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2013c. “Radically Enactive Cognition in Our Grasp.” in The Hand, an Organ of the Mind. What the Manual Tells the Mental, edited by Zdravko Radman, pp. 227–252. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2013d. “Psychology’s Inescapable Need for Conceptual Clarification.” in A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology, edited by Timothy P. Racine and Kathleen L. Slaney, pp. 28–50. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2013e. “Interpersonal Relating.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, edited by K. W. M. [Bill] Fulford, Martin Kinsey Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton, pp. 240–257. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2015. “Contentless perceiving: the very idea.” in Wittgenstein and Perception, edited by Michael Campbell and Michael O’Sullivan, pp. 63–83. London: Routledge.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2016. “Narrative Understanding.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature, edited by Noël Carroll and John Gibson, pp. 291–301. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2017a. “Basic Social Cognition without Mindreading: Minding Minds without Attributing Contents.” Synthese 194(3): 827–846.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2017b. “Memory and Narrativity.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, edited by Sven Bernecker and Kourken Michaelian, pp. 192–204. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Hutto, Daniel D. 2018. “Review of Clark (2016).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(1): 186–189.
Hutto, Daniel D. and Myin, Eric. 2013. Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262018548.001.0001.
Hutto, Daniel D. and Myin, Eric. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262036115.001.0001.
Hutto, Daniel D. and Myin, Eric. 2020. “Deflating Deflationism about Mental Representation.” in What are Mental Representations?, edited by Joulia Smortchkova, Krzystof Dolega, and Tobias Schlicht, pp. 79–100. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190686673.001.0001.
Hutto, Daniel D., Myin, Eric, Peeters, Anco and Zahnoun, Farid. 2019. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation in its Place.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by Mark Sprevak and Matteo Colombo, pp. 272–282. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Hutto, Daniel D. and Ravenscroft, Ian. 2021. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/folkpsych-theory/.
Hutto, Daniel D. and Satne, Glenda. 2015a. “Introduction: Searching for the Natural Origins of Content.” Philosophia 43(3): 505–519.
Further References
Clark, Andy. 2016. Surfing Uncertainty. Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217013.001.0001.