Harmen Ghijsen (ghijsen)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Ghijsen, Harmen. 2014a. “Phenomenalist Dogmatist Experientialism and the Distinctiveness Problem.” Synthese 191(7): 1549–1566.
Ghijsen, Harmen. 2014b. “The Non-Evidential Nature of Perceptual Experience.” Logique et Analyse 57(228): 663–681.
Ghijsen, Harmen. 2015. “The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited.” Erkenntnis 80(6): 1147–1156.
Ghijsen, Harmen. 2016a. “The Real Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetration.” Philosophical Studies 173(6): 1457–1475.
Ghijsen, Harmen. 2016b. “Norman and Truetemp Revisited Reliabilistically: A Proper Functionalist Defeat Account of Clairvoyance.” Episteme 13(1): 89–110.
Ghijsen, Harmen. 2018. “How to Explain the Rationality of Perception [on Siegel (2017)].” Analysis 78(3): 500–512.
Ghijsen, Harmen. 2020. “Do Looks Constitute Our Perceptual Evidence?” in Philosophical Issues 30: Perceptual Evidence, edited by Matthew McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg, pp. 132–147. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12176.
Simion, Mona, Kelp, Christoph and Ghijsen, Harmen. 2016. “Norms of belief.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 374–392. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.

Further References

Siegel, Susanna. 2017. The Rationality of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198797081.001.0001.