Christoph Kelp (kelp)
Cited in the following articles
Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases, Certainty and Assertion, Reliable KnowledgeContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Decock, Lieven, Douven, Igor, Kelp, Christoph and Wenmackers, Sylvia. 2014. “Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 6): 1129–1150.
Douven, Igor and Kelp, Christoph. 2011. “Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics.” Erkenntnis 75(2): 271–283.
Douven, Igor and Kelp, Christoph. 2012. “In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.” Dialectica 66(2): 289–297.
Kelp, Christoph. 2009. “Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17(4): 584–587.
Kelp, Christoph. 2011a. “Not Without Justification.” Dialectica 65(4): 581–595.
Kelp, Christoph. 2011b. “A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 152(2): 287–292.
Kelp, Christoph. 2011c. “In Defence of Virtue Epistemology.” Synthese 179(3): 409–433.
Kelp, Christoph. 2011d. “What’s the Point of ‘Knowledge’ Anyway?” Episteme 8(1): 53–66.
Kelp, Christoph. 2012a. “Do ‘Contextualist Cases’ Support Contextualism?” Erkenntnis 76(1): 115–120.
Kelp, Christoph. 2012b. “How and How Not to Take on Brueckner’s Sceptic.” The Philosophical Quarterly 62(247): 386–391.
Kelp, Christoph. 2013a. “Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(2): 265–278, doi:10.1080/00048402.2012.673726.
Kelp, Christoph. 2013b. “How to Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 88: 211–226.
Kelp, Christoph. 2013c. “Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology.” Erkenntnis 78(2): 245–252.
Kelp, Christoph. 2014a. “Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen (2013).” Erkenntnis 79(3): 729–732.
Kelp, Christoph. 2014b. “Two for the Knowledge Goal of Inquiry.” American Philosophical Quarterly 51(3): 227–232.
Kelp, Christoph. 2014c. “Epistemology Extended.” in Philosophical Issues 24: Extended Knowledge, edited by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 230–252. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kelp, Christoph. 2014d. “No Justification for Lottery Losers.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95: 205–217.
Kelp, Christoph. 2014e. “Knowledge, Understanding and Virtue.” in Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Abrol Fairweather, pp. 347–360. Synthese Library n. 366. Dordrecht: Springer.
Kelp, Christoph. 2014f. “Unreflective Epistemology.” Episteme 11(4): 411–422.
Kelp, Christoph. 2015a. “Understanding Phenomena.” Synthese 192(12): 3799–3816.
Kelp, Christoph. 2015b. “Sosa on Knowledge, Assertion and Value.” Erkenntnis 80(1): 229–237.
Kelp, Christoph. 2016. “Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(1): 27–37.
Kelp, Christoph. 2017a. “Lotteries and Justification.” Synthese 194(4): 1233–1244.
Kelp, Christoph. 2017b. “Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 223–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Kelp, Christoph. 2017c. “Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding.” in Explaining Understanding. New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Stephen R. Grimm, Christoph Baumberger, and Sabine Ammon, pp. 251–271. London: Routledge.
Kelp, Christoph. 2018. Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge.
Kelp, Christoph. 2019. “The Status of Reflection in Virtue Epistemology.” in Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho and Luca Tateo, pp. 33–44. Philosophical Studies Series n. 141. Cham: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3.
Kelp, Christoph. 2020a. “The Knowledge Norm of Blaming.” Analysis 80(2): 256–261.
Kelp, Christoph. 2020b. “Internalism, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Defeat.” in Philosophical Issues 30: Perceptual Evidence, edited by Matthew McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg, pp. 192–204. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12180.
Kelp, Christoph. 2021a. Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192896094.001.0001.
Kelp, Christoph. 2021b. “Theory of Inquiry.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103(2): 359–384, doi:10.1111/phpr.12719.
Kelp, Christoph. 2022. “Defeat and Proficiencies.” in Philosophical Issues 32: Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Deborah Perron Tollefsen, pp. 82–103. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12223.
Kelp, Christoph and Douven, Igor. 2011. “Sustaining a Rational Disagreement.” in EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, edited by Henk W. de Regt, Stephan Hartmann, and Samir Okasha, pp. 101–110. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings n. 1. Dordrecht: Springer.
Kelp, Christoph and Greco, John, eds. 2020. Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781108666404.
Kelp, Christoph and Lyons, Jack C., eds. 2016. Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kelp, Christoph and Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding. 2011. “Second-Order Knowledge.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 586–596. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Kelp, Christoph and Pritchard, Duncan. 2009. “Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning.” in, pp. 324–338.
Kelp, Christoph and Simion, Mona. 2017a. “Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion.” The Journal of Philosophy 114(2): 76–93, doi:10.5840/jphil201711426.
Kelp, Christoph and Simion, Mona. 2021. Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781009036818.
Simion, Mona and Kelp, Christoph. 2016. “The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(4): 397–409.
Simion, Mona and Kelp, Christoph. 2020. “Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 59–74. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.