Mitchell S. Green (green-ms)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Belnap, Nuel D., Jr. and Green, Mitchell S. 1994. “Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line.” in Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 365–388. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.2307/2214178.
Belnap, Nuel D., Jr. and Green, Mitchell S. 1996. “Wagering on the Future.” Unpublished manuscript.
Green, Mitchell S. 1995. “Quantity, Volubility, and some Varieties of Discourse.” Linguistics and Philosophy 18(1): 83–112.
Green, Mitchell S. 1997. “On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning.” Mind 106(422): 217–243.
Green, Mitchell S. 1999a. “Moore’s Many Paradoxes.” Philosophical Papers 28(2): 97–109.
Green, Mitchell S. 1999b. “Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” in The Logic of Strategy, edited by Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, pp. 175–195. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Green, Mitchell S. 2000a. “The Status of Supposition.” Noûs 34(3): 376–399.
Green, Mitchell S. 2000b. “Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content.” Linguistics and Philosophy 23(5): 435–473.
Green, Mitchell S. 2006. Engaging Philosophy. A Brief Introduction. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.
Green, Mitchell S. 2007a. “Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37(3): 429–448.
Green, Mitchell S. 2007b. “How Do Speech Acts Express Psychological States?” in John Searle’s Philosophy of Language. Force, Meaning and Mind, edited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis, pp. 267–284. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Green, Mitchell S. 2007c. “Speech Acts.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/speech-acts/.
Green, Mitchell S. 2008a. Self-Expression. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283781.001.0001.
Green, Mitchell S. 2008b. “Expression, Indication and Showing What’s Within [on Davis (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 137(3): 389–398.
Green, Mitchell S. 2010a. “Précis of Green (2008a).” Acta Analytica 25(1): 65–69.
Green, Mitchell S. 2010b. “Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore [on Green (2008a)].” Acta Analytica 25(1): 105–117.
Green, Mitchell S. 2010c. “Speech Acts.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, pp. 58–66. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444323528.
Green, Mitchell S. 2010d. “Perceiving Emotions.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 84: 45–61.
Green, Mitchell S. 2010e. “How and What We Can Learn from Fiction.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature, edited by Garry L. Hagberg and Walter Jost, pp. 350–366. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444315592.
Green, Mitchell S. 2013. “The Rationality of the Emotions.” in A Companion to Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 506–518. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328408.
Green, Mitchell S. 2014. “Speech Acts.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/speech-acts/.
Green, Mitchell S. 2016a. “Expressing, Showing and Representing.” in The Expression of Emotion. Philosophical, Psychological and Legal Perspectives, edited by Catharine Abell and Joel Smith, pp. 25–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781316275672.
Green, Mitchell S. 2016b. “How much Mentality is Needed for Meaning?” in, pp. 313–323.
Green, Mitchell S. 2016c. “Learning to Be Good (or Bad) in (or Through) Literature.” in Fictional Characters, Real Problems. The Search for Ethical Content in Literature, edited by Garry L. Hagberg, pp. 282–304. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715719.001.0001.
Green, Mitchell S. 2017a. “Imagery, Expression, and Metaphor.” Philosophical Studies 174(1): 33–46.
Green, Mitchell S. 2017b. “Conversation and Common Ground.” Philosophical Studies 174(6): 1587–1604.
Green, Mitchell S. 2017c. “Assertion.” Oxford Philosophy Handbooks Online, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.8.
Green, Mitchell S. 2018. “A Refinement and Defense of the Force/Content Distinction.” in New Work on Speech Acts, edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris, and Matt Moss, pp. 99–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198738831.001.0001.
Green, Mitchell S. 2020a. “Assertion and Convention.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 347–370. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Green, Mitchell S. 2020b. “Speech Acts.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/speech-acts/.
Green, Mitchell S. 2022. “Force, Content and Translucent Self-Ascriptions.” in Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition, edited by Gabriele M. Mras and Michael Schmitz, pp. 195–214. London: Routledge.
Green, Mitchell S. and Hitchcock, Christopher R. 1991. “Reflection on Reflection: van Fraassen on Belief.” Unpublished MS, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh.
Green, Mitchell S. and Williams, John N. 2011. “Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy.” Acta Analytica 26(3): 243–256.

Further References

Davis, Wayne A. 2003. Meaning, Expression and Thought. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.