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Lars Bo Gundersen (gundersen-lb)

Cited in the following articles

Sensitivity and Inductive Knowledge Revisited

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Bibliography

    Bjerring, Jens Christian and Gundersen, Lars Bo. 2020. Higher-Order Knowledge and Sensitivity.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(3): 339–349, doi:10.1017/can.2019.36.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 1997a. The Master Argument and Branching Time.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 5: 49–60.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 1997b. On Now-Ambiguities.” in Perspectives on Time, edited by Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, and Max Urchs, pp. 93–106. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 189. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 2000a. Bird on Dispositions and Antidotes.” The Philosophical Quarterly 50(199): 227–229.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 2000b. Goodman’s Gruesome Modal Fallacy.” in Things, Facts and Events, edited by Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler, and Max Urchs, pp. 447–462. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 76. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 2002. In Defence of the Conditional Account of Dispositions.” Synthese 130(3): 389–411.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 2004. Outline of a New Semantics for Counterfactuals.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85(1): 1–20.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 2005. Counterfactuals and Tracking – A Reply to Smith (2005).” SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy 6(2): 172–186.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 2010. Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis.” Erkenntnis 72(3): 353–364.
    Gundersen, Lars Bo. 2012. Knowledge, Cognitive Dispositions and Conditionals.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 66–80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.

Further References

    Smith, Joshua Allen. 2005. Gundersen on Counterfactuals and Tracking.” SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 165–171.