Isthiyaque Haji (haji)
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Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral ObligationContributions à Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Haji, Isthiyaque. 1989. “God and Omnispatiality.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 25(2): 99–108.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 1990. “The Unresolved Puzzle About Posthumous Predication.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 38: 187–193.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 1992. “Evolution, Altruism, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Biology and Philosophy 7(2): 161–175.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 1994. “Consequential Omnibenevolence.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 47: 207–222.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 1998. Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780195114744.001.0001.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 1999a. “Moral Anchors and Control.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29(2): 175–203, doi:10.1080/00455091.1999.10717510.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 1999b. “Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 2(1): 42–58.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2000. “Death and Asymmetries in Normative Appraisals.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24: Life and Death – Metaphysics and Ethics, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 135–150. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2002a. Deontic Morality and Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498794.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2002b. “Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 202–228. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2003a. “Determinism and Its Threat to the Moral Sentiments.” The Monist 86(2): 242–260.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2003b. “Flickers of Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility.” American Philosophical Quarterly 40(4): 287–302.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2004a. “Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 7(2): 131–148.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2004b. “Libertarian Openness, Blameworthiness, and Time.” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 135–150. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2004c. “Freedom, Hedonism, and the Intrinsic Value of Lives.” Philosophical Topics 32(1–2): 131–151.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2005a. “Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 106–125. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2005b. “Alternative Possibilities, Personal Autonomy, and Moral Responsibility.” in Personal Autonomy. New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, edited by James Stacey Taylor, pp. 235–257. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2006a. “On the Ultimate Responsibility of Collectives.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30: Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 292–308. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2006b. “The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and a Defeated Dilemma.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 9(2): 179–202.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2007. “Modest Libertarianism, Luck, and Control: Reply to Harrison (2008).” Polish Journal of Philosophy 1(2): 77–89.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2008a. Freedom and Value. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy n. 21. Berlin: Springer.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2008b. “Dispositional Compatibilism and Frankfurt-Type Examples.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 226–241.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2009. “Incompatibilism’s Threat to Worldly Value: Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and Pleasure.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(3): 621–645.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2010a. “Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40(3): 385–410.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2010b. “On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 80: 111–130.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2011a. “On the Reason View of Freedom and Semi-Compatibilism.” Acta Analytica 26(4): 343–353.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2011b. “Obligation, Reason, and Frankfurt Examples.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 288–307. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2012a. Reason’s Debt to Freedom. Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899203.001.0001.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2012b. “Modest Libertarianism and Practical Reason.” in Philosophical Issues 22: Action Theory, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Berit Brogaard, pp. 201–216. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2013a. “Conversation and Responsibility.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43(2): 267–286.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2013b. “Event-Causal Libertarianism’s Control Conundrums.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 88: 227–245.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2013c. “No Debt Relief in Sight: Reply to Thompson.” Polish Journal of Philosophy 7(2): 131–141.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2015. Luck’s Mischief. Obligation and Blameworthiness on a Thread. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190260774.001.0001.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2017. “Empathy and Legal Responsibility.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, edited by Heidi L. Maibom, pp. 253–263. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2019. The Obligation Dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050856.001.0001.
Haji, Isthiyaque. 2023. Obligation and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197657829.001.0001.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Caouette, Justin, eds. 2013. Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Newcastle upon Tye: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Cuypers, Stefaan E. 2001. “Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation.” Dialectica 55(3): 221–238.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Cuypers, Stefaan E. 2004. “Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Manipulation Reconsidered.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12(4): 439–464.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Cuypers, Stefaan E. 2006. “Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.” Acta Analytica 21(4): 19–35.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Cuypers, Stefaan E. 2007a. “Magical Agents, Global Induction, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(3): 343–371.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Cuypers, Stefaan E. 2007b. “Love Imperiled.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3(1): 5–20.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Cuypers, Stefaan E. 2015. “Skepticism about Autonomy and Responsibility as Educational Aims – What Next?” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 251–269. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Herbert, Ryan. 2018a. “Ability, Frankfurt Examples, and Obligation.” The Journal of Ethics 22(2): 163–190, doi:10.1007/s10892-018-9267-3.
Haji, Isthiyaque and Herbert, Ryan. 2018b. “Indeterministic Choice and Ability.” The Journal of Ethics 22(2): 191–203, doi:10.1007/s10892-018-9268-2.
Haji, Isthiyaque and McKenna, Michael. 2004. “Dialectical Difficulties in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities.” The Journal of Philosophy 101(6): 299–314, doi:10.5840/jphil2004101616.
Haji, Isthiyaque and McKenna, Michael. 2006. “Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A Reply to Palmer (2005).” The Journal of Philosophy 103(7): 363–372, doi:10.5840/jphil2006103715.
Further References
Harrison, Gerald K. 2008. “Modest Libertarianism and Clandestine Control.” Dialectica 62(4): 495–507.
Palmer, David D. 2005. “New Distinctions, Same Troubles: A Reply to Haji and McKenna (2004).” The Journal of Philosophy 102(9): 474–482, doi:10.5840/jphil2005102934.